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Kagame’s Ruse in Rwanda: The debilitating role of Authoritarianism in Rwanda and its impact
on long term, sustainable development.
by Manuel Grajeda
Following the genocide in 1994, Rwanda has been touted as a major, international
development success, gaining praise and attention from the international community who place
the prosperity of the nation in the hands of Paul Kagame, the leader of the Rwandan Patriotic
Front and the country’s current president. Indeed, under the leadership of Kagame the country
was able to get through the horrors of mass killings and nationwide destruction and it is true that
the country has made a serious turn around in the past 25 years. However, while the country is
acclaimed to be a model for developed democracy in the Global South, my research, amongst a
plethora of other scholars, has found that the nation is far from, rather portraying a gilded appeal
of democracy while a more authoritarian leadership rules over the country. At the initial start of
this research, the goal was to analyze how Kagame’s authoritarianism had so much success
developing a nation with little to no democratic freedoms in place, but as the research continued
it was discovered that the “development” of the nation is more of a ruse and the nation’s
economic and political advancement is dependent solely on maintaining an iron grip on people’s
view of the country, information and freedom of speech and thought. Internationally, the nation is
heavily funded and dependent on foreign aid, which is funneled to a select oligarchy in the
country. Political diversity is, overall, nonexistent and leadership has been accused of
manipulating economic statistics to continue the ruse of development. In this work, I aim
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to show how the lack of democratic freedoms and the brutal enforcement of authoritarian
measures has led to little economic gain in the country, false political inclusivity and diversity,
and left the country with essentially the same ethnically controlled system as was before the
genocide in 1994. While in the short term, little development has occurred, I argue that in the
long term, due to the current operation of the country under Kagame and his iron fisted
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From April to July, 1994 one of the worst modern human catastrophes laid waste to the
Rwandan countryside. After four months of internal strife, one million ethnic Tutsis, Rwanda’s
minority ethnic group, lay dead, victims of an ethnic cleansing campaign committed by the
radicalized Hutu population. During these three horrific months, the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF), led by the now president, Paul Kagame, pushed back against the extremists and
eventually brought the country out of the conflict and into an era of sustained peace, a peace
which is still apparent to this day. In fact, the country’s “economy appears to be thriving, with
annual GDP growth averaging 7.76 percent between 2000 and 2019” (Keffler, 2019), being
labeled by international leaders and UNESCO as an economic miracle. Even during the
pandemic, where much of Rwanda’s economic growth was lost, the country is said to pick up
speed in 2022 with growth exceeding what it has already produced. Today, most “commentators
attribute Rwanda’s resurgence to the visionary leadership of one man” (Taiwo, 2018), Paul
Kagame. Under his leadership the country has opened up much of Rwanda’s free market, pushed
for women’s rights, developed social welfare programs and transformed the nation culturally in
many ways. Touted by Bill Clinton as one of the greatest leaders of our time and a visionary by
Tony Blair, it truly seems under Paul Kagame’s leadership the country is worth noting as an
outstanding example of developmental success in the Global South.
However, it is also under this same leadership that Rwanda has suffered, but in a way that
is not measured in the same, but yet deemed imperative, if not mandatory for successful and
sustainable development. Kagame has been accused of several human rights abuses, voter
suppression and even, in extreme cases, ousting political competition to remain in power.
Regarding the economic success of the nation, many journalists have reported that “more than
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14,000 data points and interviews with academics shows that rising prices for Rwandan families
meant poverty most likely increased between 2010 and 2014” (Germain, 2019). Reports from
2015 onward have also shown multiple attempts to misrepresent the data regarding poverty,
statistics not well covered in GDP reports surrounding the nation.
Many of his critics argue that he rules “as a benevolent dictator, who pursues unselfish
goals for the development of the country” (Cascais, 2020). As unselfish as his efforts may be,
under Kagame’s leadership, the country has changed the constitution, allowing him to run for an
unprecedented third term in 2017, which will allow him to stay in power until 2034. While
Kagame’s success in rebuilding the nation after the genocide was a valliant and critical part of
the country’s “economic miracle” story, it also begs the question about how to properly define
‘sustainable development’ when it comes to the reconstructing of global south countries
following a social rupture like the 1994 genocide. Additionally, I will analyze how Kagame
rebuilt and united the county and the sustainability and legitimacy of that foundation- a
foundation which many scholars have called into question over the last two decades.
In the United Nations General Assembly 51/240, under article 26, the agenda for
development reads “democracy, respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms,
including the right to development, transparent and accountable governance and administration
in all sectors of society, and effective participation by civil society are also an essential part of
the necessary foundations for the realization of social and people-centred sustainable
development” (Anonymous, 1997). Furthermore, countless political and economic thinkers
attribute democratic reform as imperative to sustainable development success, yet we find
Rwanda, a country led by an iron fisted ruler, being praised by western, democratic leaders as a
economic, developmental success story- how can this be?
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It should be stated that the goal of this paper is not to diminish the value of democracy,
democratic participation and activity in governments across the world. Rather, this work simply
examines the question of whether or not successful and sustainable development can occur
without democratic institutions in place. Using Rwanda as a case study, this paper argues that
development, which has been touted by western leaders across the globe, has indeed occurred in
this situation, but is perhaps not as clear and clean as it is liked to be imagined. Rwanda’s
development has been stifled in many ways by its political system and while its development
miracle could lead us to “question whether the Eurocentric obsession with democracy is of any
benefit to developing African nations” (Taiwo, 2018), it is also important to understand the
limitations that it brings to creating sustainable development in a country riddled with political
discontent. Thus, our paper is an examination of democracy and the lack thereof within the
developing nation of Rwanda and question its sustainability and legitimate development under
Paul Kagame and his authoritarian rule.
Research Design and Methodology:
This research is based primarily on secondary research, consisting of scholarly works on
the issues of corruption within the Rwandan government (RPF) as well as the social
indoctrination within the country today. Journals, news reports, other academic thesis’ and
economic databases are used throughout this work to provide a clear and concise view of how
the Rwandan government has operated over the years after the 1994 genocide, as well as the
economic impact of the policies thereof. This research begins with a discussion on the
connection between democracy and freedom, articulating how freedom in civil society is to be
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defined. Furthermore, much of Amartya Sen’s work on freedom within societies and its
connection to sustainable development is imperative and necessary to the work, providing a base
on how this thesis analyzes and views civil society, the freedoms they hold within Rwanda and
how the violations of those freedoms have created a system where I question the long term
sustainability for development. The work continues by giving a brief overview of the colonial
history of Rwanda and the breakdown of how society was organized prior to the 1994 genocide.
Ultimately, the colonial separation of ethnic groups (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa) gave way to the
horrors seen in 1994, which later gave rise to the central figure of this thesis, Paul Kagame.
Moving into our discussion on Paul Kagame and his iron grip on the country, using
interviews conducted by other scholars in Rwanda, academic works on authoritarian
development, and eye witness accounts to policies implemented in the country, I analyze how
Kagame’s rule, while on the surface seems like a prosperous and democratic developing nation,
is actually a ruse which both politically and economically is not sustainable in the long run.
Using reports found in  recent database materials from the International Monetary Fund, United
Nations and World Bank, Rwanda from a development view demonstrates a strong dependence
on economic aid, which forces us to question how legitimate the economic success of this
“development darling” actually is. From a political point of view, I analyze published  interviews
with former politicians and citizens in the country who were not a part of the ruling party, or
defected away from it, to show how the political fabric within the country is thin and unstable,
especially with the development of social media where many people opposed to the rule have
been able to, within the last decade, post their thoughts. Of course as will be analyzed throughout
this work the repercussions for going against the monolith ideology of the RPF and ultimately
Kagame, have resulted in disappearances, extended jail times, exiles and, in the worst cases,
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murders. Thus, with repercussions like this, fear seems to be the major hold over the people,
which I argue, in the long term development, goes against democratic reforms and is not
sustainable in the long run. Especially because Paul Kagame has maintained, and will continue to
maintain, central authority over the country for over thirty years. It also seems that there is no
one in the plans to replace or follow his leadership, which also begs the question of political
sustainability in the country after he is gone.
Comparatively, this has been seen historically. After the death of Mao Zedong, a notable
authoritarian leader, the Communist party of China flailed to find leadership and the economy
stagnated for almost a decade. In the post Joseph Stalin world of the Soviet Union, the country
had to go through a period of de-Stalinization, cleansing the country of its horrors committed
under the totalitarian ruler, arguably never truly reaching a freely expressive state until the
collapse of the country in the early 1990’s. In Uganda, just north of Rwanda, following the
ousting of General Idi Amin Dada of Uganda, the country’s inflation rose to 1000$, which the
country is still reeling from in many ways to this day. While for the sake of this research, it is
difficult to compare a small, landlocked country like Rwanda to megalithic countries like China
and the former USSR, the point here is to note that authoritarian leadership throws away the
process of political transition and, thus, leaves political and economic uncertainty for the future.
For a small country that is highly dependent on foreign aid, it leaves us questioning what
happens after Kagame’s authoritarian years are over?
There is a plethora of literature regarding autocratic rule and the benevolence thereof,
which is used throughout this thesis. It is important to analyze how autocrats deemed benevolent
rule over their nations and the successes that can come with that. This paper strives to view those
successes and examine their legitimacy within the framework of sustainable development. While
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there is research that suggests “some autocratic regimes have fundamentally transformed their
economies, despite serious deficiencies along a range of other dimensions” (Gilson & Milhaupt,
2011), I raise the concern that those other dimensions, such as extreme violations of civil
liberties, political rights and transparency are imperative to the long term and successful
development of these nations, using Rwanda as our case study. In particular, I will be examining
the strategies used by the RPF in the aftermath of the genocide, and how those policies have
aimed to control the way many Rwandans view their history and their role in the country today.
Using eye witnesses, published accounts of those who have gone through the social
indoctrination processes known as ingando camps and judicial process of the Gacaca court
system, both of which are controlled by RPF officials, I will examine how the tight control over
the narrative has been imperative to maintaining dominance over the political infrastructure in
Rwanda. Testimonials from political leaders published and documented in journals and reports
from organizations such as Human Rights Watch as well as government supporting news outlets
such as The New Times, will decisively acknowledge and support the fact that the aims of the
country’s leadership are more towards an obedient way of thinking that is dictated by the RPF
and Kagame, creating an atmosphere of political, civil and social repression that is highly
guarded and secured by the national government. Using these sources and published accounts
and reports of political and social repression, I demonstrate that Rwanda, while perhaps from the
outside looks like a democratic, developing state, is in fact an autocratic regime ruled by
tyrannical practices, which while having some successes in maintaining peace and security in the
country in the short run, in the long term, could be devastating as the foundation is supported by




In this next chapter I will be examining the literature and supporting research behind our
question regarding whether democracy is needed in sustainable development. In our first section
I will examine the connection between democracy and freedom, exploring much of Amartya
Sen’s work on the two and how imperative they are for successful, sustainable development in
the long term. Following that, I will examine the role the international community plays in
regard to Rwanda’s development, analyzing how a nation with an autocratic, oppressive leader
seems to go unchallenged in the international political sphere. On the contrary, Rwanda is
deemed an international development economic miracle by many democratic leaders throughout
the world. Using Filip Reyntjens work on Rwanda and Paul Kagame’s political history, I
examine how an international guilt syndrome dominates the political affairs between Rwanda
and other democratic countries due to the lack of response from the international community
during the 1994 genocide. In this section, I examine how, due to this event, the international
community tends to ignore the suppression of civil, social and political rights in the country,
arguing more that the rapid economic success of the nation, which I will call into question, and
not the democratic and civil development, right after the genocide is attributed to the leadership
of Kagame despite the well documented claims of abuse, jail time and murder.
Later I also examine how international funding is part of the problem that keeps Rwanda
under the oppressive rule of Kagame, noting that the high percentage of international aid pours
directly into the RPF’s campaign projects while making it illegal for those outside the political
party- in other words, aid is monopolized and used to maintain oppressive social tactics, such as
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controlling news outlets and free speech; thus, manipulating the way outsiders view the country’s
democratic freedom development. While some of these projects are for the development of the
country, they also help to support campaign maneuvers, which have helped create economic
barriers for dissident political parties and suppress free speech, press and information throughout
the country.
In our last few sections I examine the literature regarding the social engineering programs
and judicial processes used in Rwanda to maintain a common narrative that is not to be deviated
from by the country’s citizens. I note the process of justice (Gacaca) used post the genocide
created an uneasy system of justice and the Ingando camps portray a vision of the RPF and
Kagame as savior like beings, creating a country ruled by a cult of personality that when gone, is
unsustainable in the long term for development. Additionally, our research acknowledges that
with the development of social media platforms such as YouTube, Instagram TikTok and
Facebook, more of the citizenry of the country, and those outside as well, are speaking out
against the regime, which has resulted in kidnappings, disappearances, murder and, in some
extreme examples, cases of violations of international law. These sections highlight arguments
made by Amartya Sen, Filip Reyntjens and Hilary Matfess to name a few, that while
authoritarianism can have rapid economic growth, the sacrifice of democratic freedoms creates
instability, which I argue throughout this work goes against the ideas of sustainable development.
The research used for this consists of academic thesis, journals, international and domestic
newspapers as well interviews conducted by many scholars with local Rwandese.
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The connection of democracy and freedom:
Understanding democracy’s connection to freedom and freedom's connection to
democracy can be a confusing, lexiconic conversation due to the fact that when it comes to
development there are a series of different theories and definitions that it abides by. For some,
more so in the economics field, “a basic precondition of development is a minimum legal and
contractual structure and a set of well-defined and enforced property rights; the general
presumption in this literature is that democracy is better-suited in providing this environment
(Bardhan, 1999). For other theories in development, “freedom means individuals may choose
how to interact on a voluntary basis outside the purview of the state” (Wenders, 1990). For Nobel
Prize Winner, Amartya Sen, attention must be paid to the “expansion of the ‘capabilities’ of
persons to lead the kind of lives they value- and have reason to value” (Sen, 1999). Within these
definitions lies a common ground of freedoms and the capability to act out these freedoms. But
when discussing freedoms what exactly does that mean? Within this work I examine freedoms
from a Senian approach, analyzing how members of a society (in our case study, the Rwandese)
are able to interact within the political and social atmosphere. With this, meaning how free are
people to vote as they please and is information available to the people without oppressive
violence to coerce a certain way of thinking? Are people able to freely speak their opinion
without fear of oppression and retaliation? Does the political infrastructure create a place for free
thinking or does it aim to manipulate the masses through controlled media and indoctrinization
practices? Thus, “the success of a society is to be evaluated, in this view, primarily by the
substantive freedoms that the members of that society enjoy” (Sen, 1999).
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Within the field of international development, Amartya Sen’s approach seems to have
dominated international institutional thinking as well as Global North nations involved in
sustainable development, as seen in UN Assembly 51/240, in the Global South. Many of these
points align almost verbatim with Sen’s essential freedoms ranging from government
transparency, collective civil societal involvement in governance and the simple freedom to think
how one chooses to think without government repression. Thus, how a citizen participates,
interacts and enjoys these freedoms, perhaps, is a simple way of explaining the connection
between freedom and democracy as democracies untether (free) citizens from more authoritarian
aspects of governance in development, where they may be coaxed, indoctrinated or pressured
into a certain way of thinking. Citizens who are able to live in societies where their government
allows for the freedom of political diversity and security, press, speech and governing
transparency creates the free citizen that Sen is referring to. A government that represents the
whole and the diversity thereof also must share the values of these freedoms as citizens who
enjoy these freedoms must be allowed to express them within their political governance. One
goes hand in hand with the other and, as Sen argues, is imperative to sustainable development.
Within the case of Rwanda I will analyze and measure these freedoms and how these
freedoms or lack thereof play a role in the sustainability of the country, both economically and
politically. I will also analyze how Rwanda is portrayed by many in the international community
as a  development darling due to its quick reforms that took place immediately after the
genocide. However, our examination will look much closer at the political institutions and
infrastructure in the country to see whether or not the freedoms articulated by Sen and other
scholars for sustainable development hold up and can be sustained through Rwanda’s iron fisted,
“benevolent” authoritarian state.
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Colonial History of Rwanda:
Rwanda is a small, landlocked nation located in central Africa with a colonial history
stretching back to the early 20th century. Prior to the emergence of imperial rule in central
Africa, Rwanda was divided into primarily two ethnic groups: The Hutu and the Tutsi and of
which the former tended to be farmers and the latter cattle herders. The system, known as
Ubuhake, defined “a social system in which the Hutus worked in the service of Tutsis in
exchange for cattle'' (Skok, 2020). As this system was normalized, so too did it characterize the
relationship between the two ethnic groups. In 1899, when the Germans arrived in the country,
Rwanda was, for a short time, a colony of the East African section of the German empire and it
was during this time that the subjugation of the Rwandese, specifically the Hutu, began and
ethnic segregation, placing the Tutsis in a socio-economically superior position based on their
biological identity being closer to caucasian and, thus, making them more fit to rule the country,
or so the theory went.
However, after the defeat of the Germans in World War I, the colony was passed onto the
Belgians and absorbed into their empire as a mandate under the League of Nations. While the
colony passed back and forth between two empires of the time, it was under the rule of the
Belgians that Rwanda’s colonial-ethnic segregation truly began. Under the Belgians the “most
lasting effect was how the colonial authorities racialised the differences between Hutu, Twa and
Tutsi” (Anonymous, 2016). Under the Belgian government, ethnic identities became cemented in
society, a radical change as prior they were more “fluid identities which people moved in and out
of depending on the work they did and their status in society. The colonial government made
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them permanent markers, people were either Hutu or Tutsi and you were born into one or the
other” (Anonymous, 2021). Throughout the 1920’s and 1930’s these ethnic identities were
institutionalized at the federal level in Rwanda, mandating that all Hutus were to be ruled by
Tutsis and, furthermore, “through changes in the legal system and mandatory identity cards to
specify whether people were Hutu or Tutsi, the Belgians had constructed the Hutu and Tutsi as
two distinct races” (Anonymous, 2021).
In the post World War II years, and after the worst famine in the country’s history
(1941-45), colonial leaders started changing some older institutionalized systems in place, for
example getting rid of the Ubahake system and granting Hutus, whom had developed an elite
class, more rights in society. Much of this was due to pressure put on authorities from the United
Nations, which the country had become a mandate of in the post war years. Local councils began
to hold elections, however, much of these higher level positions were dominated by Tutsi
leadership (a theme that will come up later in our discussion of Kagame’s ruling party
leadership) and tended to move towards a form of subjugation of the Hutu majority. In 1956,
national elections finally came to be, but “because representatives were elected indirectly by an
electoral college made up of mainly Tutsi chiefs, the result was in favour of Tutsi
representatives” (Anonymous, 2021), thus, creating a new future of Rwandan leadership
dominated by the minority opinion of Tutsi officials. In the latter years of the 1950’s, Rwandans
began demanding independence from Belgium, but with this new system of government where
Tutsis held almost all political power (Hutus during this period only controlled roughly 6% of
representative positions) it became very clear that “all the reforms were limited in scope or in
implementation and at the end of the day would never be enough to give Hutu people equal
rights in Rwanda” (Anonymous, 2021).
12
Decolonization and the Rise of Paul Kagame:
In the late 1950’s going into the 1960’s, Rwandan political parties began to form around
the ideas of independence and how the country should be ruled in a post-colonial era. Much of
the tensions between the political parties rested, not in colonial/colonized oppression, but in the
ethnic differences between Hutus and Tutsis, where as leading, aristocratic Tutsi officials
believed the country should return to its roots which included the system in which Tutsi ruled
over Hutu. It should be noted that multiple political parties formed during this period such as
“two main Tutsi aligned parties UNAR (traditionalist and monarchist) and RADER
(soft-reformist), and the two main Hutu aligned parties were PARMEHUTU (revolutionary and
eventually anti-monarchist) and APROSOMA (started out as a populist party for both Hutu and
Tutsi, and became the moderates)” (Anonymous, 2021). Rwanda’s post-colonial history, while
very different from the country’s contemporary political system, is not unfamiliar to a multiple
political party system in which political ideologies sharply contrasted with each other. However,
it should be understood that the differences in ideologies led to violent clashes between the
groups, resulting in escalating hostilities all the way up to the genocide in 1994.
By the 1960’s, the Hutu party PARMEHUTU gained significant political power and
established the First Rwandan Republic, which led to the ousting of the monarchy, a Tutsi
exodus and a rise in Hutu dominance within the socio-political infrastructure within the country.
However, in 1973, as socio-economic conditions collapsed within the country due to
unemployment and little opportunity, Major General Juvénal Habyarimana seized power in a
military coup to ‘quell the unrest’ within the country, forming what would be known as the
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Second Rwandan Republic. While Rwanda during the early post-colonial years created a diverse
political system, the system itself was not sustainable due to the violent dividing factors
established under colonial rule between Hutus and Tutsis. Perhaps a foundational step, which
would later be instituted in many ways by Paul Kagame upon his ascension to power,
Habyarimana created the new political party, the Révolutionnaire pour le Développement, which
all Rwandans were forced to be part of. Refugees, located in Nairobi, Kenya, simultaneously
formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). However, within Rwanda, all other political parties
were outlawed and elections generated an astounding turnout with 98% of the vote going to
President Habyarimana (a similar theme we will see in Kagame’s elections post 2000). Of
course, these elections can and should be labeled as rigged, but they gave the appearance that the
developing nation was in line with democratic tendencies, a notion that I will examine more as
Paul Kagame’s current regime demonstrates similar patterns of this style of authoritarianism.
It is in the 1980’s that we see the rise of Paul Kagame as a key and central figure within
the Rwandan discourse. By 1987, Kagame was Chief of Military Intelligence in Uganda (where
Rwandan refugees were) and helped the National Resistance Movement plan an invasion into
Rwanda in the following years. Kagame, who had returned from military training in the United
States, helped in the planning of this invasion, which won several victories in the early 90’s, but
failed to turn these into long term, strategic holds on the countries hostilities. Much of this was
due to the fact that the country was dominated by Hutu farmers who saw the RPF as rebels and
would flee upon their arrival. It was during this time that over 950,000 Hutu were internally
displaced around the country. It became clear upon the invasion there would be an “end to the
attempts of reconciliation which the regime of President Habyarimana had begun” (Anonymous,
2021). Instead of politics focusing on national unification, it would be one focused on Hutu
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power and by 1992 the youth militia groups started to form around the country, the most famous
known as the Interahamwe. As these groups grew to prominence, violence and massacres were
committed against the Tutsis within the country and “both the Interahamwe and the Rwandan
government army were supplied with weapons and materials by the French.” (Mamdani, 2002).
In turn, and using these internationally supplied arms, to “strengthen the government’s war
effort, President Habyarimana began arming the civilian population” (Mamdani, 2002). These
groups would be central in the civilian militias who would carry out the attrocities committed
during the genocide in 1994. Adding fuel to the fire, a peace treaty, signed in Arusha, Tanzania
between the Rwandan government and the RPF, was rejected by the president due to it excluding
proponents of Hutu power from the political order. After this, the Rwandan Prime Minister “was
killed together with the ten UN soldiers guarding her, the UN (with the USA in charge) decided
to pull out all but 270 of the UN soldiers stationed in the country” (Mamdani, 2002). With
tensions high, the spark was on April 4th, 1994 when the president’s plane was shot down and
his then prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, confirming Hutu suspicions that a Tutsi take
over of Rwanda was iminents and, thus, the genocide ensued. On July 4th, three months after the
genocide began, Kigali was captured by the RPF and a new government was installed with Paul
Kagame as the de facto leader. During this time it is estimated that over two million Hutu fled
the country, mainly to The Democratic Republic of the Congo, a location of another conflict that
would ensue in what is to be known as a revenge genocide under the reign of Kagame in the
following years.
Since this time, Kagame has held central and almost unquestioned power within the
country, using this historical moment to develop a sort of cult of personality, which dominates
the everyday socio-political infrastructure of the country. Much of the contemporary criticisms of
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Kagame’s dictatorial hold on Rwandan authority are brushed away due to the historical narrative
that was generated after the war. Admittedly, the international community failed to act in a
manner that was morally and ethically needed at the time. The French supplying of weaponry to
Habyarimana’s government and violent militia groups would and still does play a huge part in
Kagame's justification for power in modern Rwandan. Additionally, the UN troop pull-out and
international denial of the genocide left Kagame with an extrodinary ability to illustrate a
narrative with him as the unquestioned liberator and hero of Rwanda, single handely leading the
country to a better future; thus, the interrnatioal guilt narrative as discussed by Filip Reynjentes
was created. This is the narrative which plays a major role in the question being asked regarding
the sustainability under Kagame’s modern authoritarian hold on the country and whether or not a
developing nation like Rwanda can sustain itself in a post-Kagame status- in other words, the
long run.
International Guilt:
Throughout the genocide western nations took a step back, France even going as far as
withdrawing its own citizens from the country to avoid them being caught up in the violence.
The United States, among other Global North leaders, played ignorant to the carnage, stating
they “did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with which [Rwandans] were being
engulfed by this unimaginable terror” (Robinson, 2016). For the United States, being, for the first
time in over five decades, in a post-Cold War world, meant the intervention around the world had
to be strategic and much of it had to do with the “spread of democracy in the eastern bloc and
other erstwhile communist nations'' (Giridharadas, 2018). While the U.S. had and was playing a
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role in Africa, after the failure in Somalia, the U.S. “had no interests in Rwanda, a small central
African country with no minerals or strategic value” (Carol, 2004). Thus, as seen, Rwanda and
its leadership, Paul Kagame and the RPF, were left alone to handle the genocide and reconstruct
the country afterwards, shaping the way to Kagame’s iron grip on the country, which has been
reinforced by western leaders, due to their lack of itervention, ever since.
As the genocide came to an end in July, 1994, much of the western world realized that its
lack of action during the genocide arguably contributed to its continuation. As President Clinton
stated “as our fragmentary awareness of crimes grew into indisputable facts, far too little was
done” (Robinson, 2016), and indeed this was probably true. Intervention from western powers
would have indeed, potentially, had an impact on the longevity of the genocide, but because of
this inaction, the relationship between Rwanda and the west today, especially given the honorary
title Rwanda holds as the ‘economic miracle of Africa,’ is one which far too often ignores the
true actions used by the RPF and Kagame to maintain stability and development in the country.
Kagame’s government often waivers between “political openness and inclusivity and on
the other hand a violent mode of management and discriminatory practices” (Renjentes, 2004).
In foreign policy, massive amounts of fleeing Hutus, who left the country during the genocide to
seek shelter in The Democratic Republic of the Congo (mainly children, elderly and the sick)
were ruthlessly extinguished in the 1996 invasion of the country as part of a revenge campaign
for the Tutsi extermination in Rwanda. Many experts label this as Africa’s World War and as of
now the number of casualties hovers around six million. I will discuss this conflict and how it
alligns with Kagame’s style of governing in further detail later in this work, but in the aftermath
“The International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development (CIDPDD), in
teaming with the African Association for the Defense of Human Rights in DRC (ASADHO),
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concluded that ‘it appears pertinently that the Rwandan government can be held accountable for
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide’” (Anonymous, 2018), crimes
Kagame and his RPF fought to end in 1994 and which ultimately brought him to power.
Still, within this framework, and the ‘democratic leadership’ possessed in the country,
western democratic leaders still praise Kagame for his remarkable governing and economic
development success. In fact, “the country has also benefited from a steep increase in foregin
direct investment (FDI) since the mid-1990’s, climbing from U.S. $7,660,000 to over U.S.
$110,000 since 2004” (Matfess, 2015). With a country riddled with a history of ethnic violence
and a governing party that later committed in an act of revenge genocide against the Hutus in a
foreign nation (Zaire); authoritarian leadership with shadow parties that resemble democracy;
and an utter lack of government and political transperency, how is it that this country still
receives foreign aid to maintain its sustainable development? Furthermore, why does a country
like this garner such praise from the western world for its governance? As professor Filip
Reynjentes explores “the Rwandan government has succeeded in avoiding condemnation by
astutely exploiting the ‘genocide credit’ and by skillful information management” (Reynjentes,
2004). Countries who were aware of the genocide and did little to nothing (France, UK, and
U.S.) are  driven “by an acute guilt syndrome after the genocide, they reasoned in terms of ‘good
guys’ and ‘bad guys’, the RPF naturally being the ‘good guys’” (Reyjentes, 2004). Thus, in
many ways, the international democratic community contributes to this continuation of
quasi-authoritarian rulership in the country due to a guilt syndrome that dates back to the post
genocide years. The fact that Rwanda is able to show on paper in economic and measurable
terms that it is growing, although this statistics are highly questioned, and perhaps has a facade
of a democratic government, allows western nations to feel good about their contribution and
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point to the nation as a developing success. However, while the economic achievements of the
country are perhaps significant and exemplary, this does not mean that democratic and political
freedoms are enjoyed in this country and does not demonstrate that this could maintain long term
success.
On the contrary, it would seem that much of Kagame’s iron fisted rule is responsible for
much of the rapid short term success that we see today; thus, this leads us to question, since such
a successful authoritarian nation has emerged with western praise: is democracy actually part of
the equation for successful, sustainable development? Kagame himself in a February, 2021
interview stated “the west does not define democracy in Africa” (Kagame, 2021). Perhaps, when
examining development, the one size fits all, European centered ideas of democratization within
other continental countries are displaying an irrelevance when it comes to cases such as Africa.
Still, it should be asked, perhaps, if this is the kind of development that can be sustained? What
happens after Kagame finally leaves office? Democratic institutions allow for change to be
normalized and under an authoritarian rule this leaves a huge question for the country’s
sustainability. While Kagame’s authoritarian rule has led to massive economic growth in the
country it does not seem his political nature has followed the same path, leaving us to question
whether or not this economic miracle country has the capacity to follow or enhance the same
footsteps in a post-Kagame Rwanda.
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The Theory of Benevolence:
The concept of autocracies or a benevolent dictatorship is not a new phenomena and is
“a perpetually popular concept in economic development discussions” (Easterly, 2011). Pinning
an exact definition on a ‘benevolent’ dictator is tough and maneuvers through the theories of
autocracies in general. William Easterly notes “benevolent autocrats assume a very simple theory
where the autocrat chooses policies and then implements them. In other words, they assume an
omnipotent autocrat, so that the outcomes observed under autocracy reflect the intentions of the
autocrat” (Easterly, 2011). In other cases, the autocrat is part of a system of oligarchs with the
main point of it being “not the absence of an electorate but a much smaller one limited to the
elite, but whom still hold the autocrat accountable to their interests” (Easterly, 2011). In the case
of Paul Kagame, while he works with, in parliament and other political offices, RPF members,
Kagame has been known to shuffle around political positions of people within his party he
deems a threat. While Easterly here notes that some autocracies can take the form of ruling
oligarchs, Paul Kagame sits at the head of this table and anyone who goes against his political
bidding is usually removed or, in cases I will discuss later on, jailed or worse. Thus, I would
conclude that Paul Kagame rules as a one-man show- an autocrat with no one in his own political
party to keep him in check.
For authors such as Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman, the modern autocrat maintains
their authority not by the old means, of ousting political dissidents and threats of violence (which
still does occur in Rwanda), but rather through a language that is more in line with the Global
North- a language riddled with western notions. For Treisman and Guriev, the secret of modern
autocrats lies not the terrorizing of their own citizens through imposing ideologies or isolation,
20
but rather they “achieve many of the same ends by manipulating public opinion” (Guriev &
Treisman, 2019). The key is to control information, how it’s interpreted to the people of that
country and how the outside world views their leadership through an economic and political lens.
There have been many cases where Kagame has been criticized for his role in human rights
abuses, the lack of political transparency and the denial of certain freedoms, such as a free
speech and open press. When criticized about this in an interview in February, 2021 Kagame
simply replied “the west does not define democracy in Africa” (Kagame, 2021). This statement
falls in line with Guriev and Treisman’s ideology here. Kagame’s response is deflective and also
manipulative, allowing him to change the interpretation of democracy to apply to his way of
viewing it, concluding that western ideas of democracy do not apply on the African continent,
thus their criticisms hold no validity. This is mirrored again in a United Nations General
Assembly meeting in 2017 when he was questioned about his speech on democracy in Rwanda
following a plethora of reports regarding human rights abuses, elimination of political opponents
and oppression of the press. Kagame responded in a way that aligns, yet again, with Guriev and
Treisman’s narrative:
It’s always difficult to accuse me of anything and say prove
yourself innocent...I want to turn it to you and say prove me guilty.
That’s where the problem lies. You know the press, human rights
groups, what they say about me personally or about
Rwanda...when you are in Rwanda and you are dealing with these
decent human beings...also in Rwanda... and they tell you their
own stories… you won’t face even .0001% of what they’re talking
about. The real life there is completely different than what the
young girl is talking about [referencing the woman asking the
question]…Rwandans are there and are no different than you, what
you aspire to be, to have, to do...they are no different, but it’s as if
Rwandans are treated as a botanical garden, where they just water
flowers. No, they are human beings like anyone else in this room.
So this so-called ‘human...I don’t know what…’ I tell you what:
half of my life I’ve been living in the trenches, not sure if I’ll live
the next day….I was fighting for my rights, which no one in any
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human rights organization could give me. And even now cannot
give me or cannot give Rwanda. So it's cynical and absurd that
anyone would be there talking about the violations and me, as
leader of my own people, violating their rights. It’s just an absurd
insult.” (Kagame, 2017).
Within the room of this response were many delegates, reporters and members of the
international assembly and institutions, most of which were praising the leader on his economic
success for the country. Additionally, they seemed to agree with him regarding this, further
establishing the idea that international institutions and leaders are sympathetic to Rwanda, and
allow for Kagame to manipulate public opinion in spite of the amount of evidence supporting the
interviewer’s claim. Even in the international sphere, Kagame is able to influence and manipulate
public opinion about his country by turning the question back at those who criticize him. From
the international perspective, leaders and organizations seem hesitant to condemn Kagame on
these issues due to what Filip Reynjentes notes as the international guilt. So, it can be concluded
that Kagame holds his power using Guriev and Treisman’s narrative on swaying public opinion,
which is reinforced by Reynjentes notion of international guilt syndrome. Of course, Guriev and
Tresiman continue, while the aforementioned methods are preferred within autocratic regimes,
violence can and most certainly does occur, but rather than openly acknowledging their part in it,
an old form of repression, modern autocrats tend “to conceal their involvement or camouflage its
purpose” (Guriev & Treisman, 2019). Additionally with many leaders, like Paul Kagame, who
fall into this category, international funding and aid are crucial to their economic growth so much
of their leadership is boasting “good economic performance and public service provision”
(Guriev & Treisman, 2019). Hence, this can, and does, generate a sort of illusion that economic
success coincides with a benevolent leader and a benevolent leader must have the interest of their
people at heart. This sort of thinking follows an idea where economic growth and democratic
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institutionalization are symbiotic; however, as will be seen, they most certainly are not
conjoined.
There tends to be a mixing of the view that the economics of a country coincide with
democracy. Since the 1980’s neoliberal policies dominated the development landscape as world
leaders and international organizations pushed for more open markets, which in turn gave them
access and developed new market place relationships between the Global North and Global
South. Of course, the subjective economic growth that came from these policies being
implemented was deemed a success due to neoliberal policies being viewed as opening up more
individual market freedoms for people of that developing nation. Niklas Olsen, professor of
history at the University of Copenhagen, remarks in his work The Sovereign Consumer that “by
making a direct parallel between choice in the marketplace and at the ballot box, neoliberals not
only depicted sovereign consumers as the key drivers of capitalism and of liberal democracy, but
also described the daily voting on the marketplace as the real driver of individual representation
and participation in society” (Olsen, 2019); thus, the individualization that free market growth
creates became directly linked to the concept of a more free and democratic society. Olsen
continues by noting that “it’s pretty clear that the democracy of consumers identified with the
market economy often represented an analogy pertaining only to economic processes and not to a
political order characterized by traditional democratic institutions and virtues (Olsen, 2019).
While the economic growth that is created under these autocratic rule may be great, this is not
analogous to the same construction of democratic order within the same regimes that is
imperative to maintaining healthy development in the long run.
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In many ways, market freedom, and its expansion into developing nations, has become a
sort of loophole for Global North democratic nations to be able to openly work with autocratic
leaders by justifying benevolence through a market economic approach. So now “prioritizing the
marketplace over democracy is a recurring pattern in neoliberal ideology and practice (Olsen,
2019) and creates a sort of new relationship between the democratic north and developing south:
Global North leaders are able to view themselves as sort of ‘market place saviors’ for developing
countries, which justifies their relationship between them and the autocrat. For the autocrats, they
justify their rule through their economic success, which is justified by praise from the
international community. In turn, this leads to more aid to flow to the nation, creating a new
prerogative for developing nations: economic success trumps democratic institution building, a
factor promoted by international organizations such as the United Nations and other world
leaders, but seemingly ignored under the curtain or free market trade and neoliberal policies. To
be clear, economic growth in Rwanda seems to equate to benevolence.
These principles of economic success go much further into the realm of economic aid as
well. For western nations to support autocratic leaders openly, without implying some sort of
good, would go completely against foreign policy stances of western, democratic nations so the
idea of benevolence has woven itself into the fabric of humanitarian aid because  “thinking of the
autocrat as mostly “benevolent” (another common euphemism is “developmental”) takes the
focus off autocracy and puts it back on a more appealing image such as the needy populations of
those nations” (Easterly, 2011). Thus, aid can flow, and has heavily increased, to these countries
if their leader’s policies are deemed as primarily benevolent. As long as growth continues and
mild democratic forms ensue, we see that Global North nations have no problem contributing to
these regimes as long as they present themselves as benevolent leaders with economic success.
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However, is Paul Kagame’s Rwanda an actual economic miracle? Furthermore, what is this
“democracy” that he seems to have created?
Paul Kagame’s Rwanda- a Ruse Democracy:
In 2000, Paul Kagame was elected president of Rwanda and since then, the country has
not seen another president in office, creating an autocratic legacy lasting over twenty years and
could continue for ten plus more. From an international point of view, Kagame has become a sort
of super star when it comes to development in Africa and is often attributed as the shining light
of success as under his rule “economic growth has been made possible by the strength of the
state and the ruling party’s grip on power” (Keffler, 2019). As discussed, this super star status is
often attributed to the fact that, on paper, Rwanda has seen amazing economic growth since the
1994 genocide, thriving at an “annual GDP growth averaging 7.76 percent between 2000 and
2019, and growth expected to continue at a similar pace over the next few years” (Keffler, 2019).
As of now, according to the World Bank, Rwanda is expected to “reach Middle Income Country
(MIC) status by 2035 and High-Income Country (HIC) status by 2050” (World Bank, 2021).
Arguably, within these contexts, and within the contextual, neoliberal mixing of democracy and
economics, surely democratic institutions would follow suit, yes? Unfortunately, this is where
Kagame’s Rwanda falls short and where the concept of sustainable development, from an
institutional point of view (institutional being World Bank, International Monetary Fund and
United Nations), being measured through an economic sense fails to articulate the complexities
and sacrifices the Rwandese have and continue to endure in order to achieve this “economic
miracle”- a miracle which I, along with many other scholars deeply question.
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However, in line with our original question: is democracy needed as a precursor for
sustainable development? Arguably, Rwanda presents a case where democracy, as viewed via
western, institutional terms, is not the foundation of their development. Rather, the democratic
institutions that are in place within the country act as a sort of theatrical buffer, a distraction or a
ruse democracy used to appeal to developed country’s leaders who occasionally chime in with
their thoughts on Rwanda’s development and as the 69 “year-old presides over a seemingly
peaceful country, the west seems content” (Anonymous, 2017).  With this in mind, and as we
dive into the question of the necessity of democracy within sustainable development, it should be
examined what kind of system Rwanda has established and the institutions in place that have
lended themselves to the so-called economic success of the nation.
Hilary Matfess, in her work Rwanda and Ethiopia: Developmental Authoritarianism and
the New Politics of African Strong Men gives us a great outline to the way the Rwandan
government operates within the fabric of sustainable development. While Rwanda, as discussed,
is a nation often characterized by its high growth and formal institutions of democracy, their civil
society is often stunted due to the stronghold the government has on the daily life of the people.
Matfess defines Rwanda as a “‘developmental authoritarianism,’referring to nominally
democratic governments that provide significant public works and services while exerting
control over nearly every facet of society” (Matfess, 2015). She argues that there are five steps in
which developmental authoritarians assume power, President Paul Kagame being an example of
this. The regime is unified and justified to power, “following a major social rupture” (Matfess,
2015) and, upon their ascent, impose major restrictions on typical civil rights found in the
developed world such as free speech, association and identity. This is usually justified by
manipulating the social rupture, the 1994 genocide, and thus, grants an enourmous amount of
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power to the ruling autocratic regime, which is supported by the populace who endured the
horrors and hardships of the past conflict. Paul Kagame, in his rise to becoming the leader of
Rwanda, solidified his grip on power legally and internationally during the Arusha Accords,
following the genocide, where the Funadamental Law of Rwanda was, single handledly, changed
by the RPF. While under the Arusha Accords, power was to be shared amongst Hutus and Tutsis,
the “amended Fundamental Law was, in effect, a subtle piece of constitutional engineering which
attempted to mask the consolidation of the RPF’s hold on political power” (Reyntjens, 2004).
Matfess continues stating that developmental authoritarians tend to be very involved in the
economy, promoting a free market approach, which gain them favor within the international
economic sphere, as well as tend to be a “party-organized, militaristic mobilization of the
population for development efforts” (Matfess, 2015), a concept seen within the conflict between
Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a conflict that has lasting reminders of the
1994 genocide and revenge genocide campaign of 1996  and which continues to this day. Lastly,
developmental authoritarians have an uneasy relationship with their neighbors, like the DRC, but
also tend to garner favor from western powers while simultaneously rejecting their notions on
human rights and democracy.
So what does the Rwandan political and civil structure look like today? Much of the
country’s political infrastructure has the allure of democratic development, having national direct
elections for the president and the national assembly while the “the electoral system for local
elections up to the level of the Senate is indirect” (Anonymous, 2020).  The country’s leaders are
broken down into district counselors (Akarere), sector counselors (Imerenge) and cell counselors
(Utugari), who are just above the last level of village representatives.  “The Senate has 26
members. 12 senators are elected by the district councils, while two are elected by university
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staff. 12 senators are appointed by the president and four appointed by the National Consultative
Forum of Political Organizations (NFPO)” (Anonymous, 2020). As of now, the country is a
multiparty democracy “with regular elections, which lend an aura of legitimacy to their rule
within the international sphere” (Matfess, 2015). All in all, with the economic miracle and the
democratic structures in place, Rwanda has generated a mask of legitimacy within the
international sphere when it comes to falling within the definitions of what it takes to be a
development darling. However, upon a deeper analysis it becomes very clear that, while there
have been great successes in Rwanda both politically and economically, the country’s
foundational structures are far from being along the international definitions of sustainable
development and far from being foundationally sound.
Political Scientist and Great Lakes scholar Filip Reyntjens unveils in detail the facts
about Rwanda’s governance in his work Rwanda, Ten Years on: From Genocide to Dictatorship.
While Reyntjens describes a country that has achieved “rapid institutional reconstruction and
relatively good bureaucratic governance, it has also concentrated power and wealth in the hands
of a very small minority, practised ethnic discrimination, eliminated every form of dissent,
destroyed civil society, conducted fundamentally flawed ‘democratizastion’ processes, and
massively violated human rights at home and abroad” (Reyntjens, 2004). In regard to Reyntjens
first point regarding centralization of power: this is absolutely the case and was described in an
an International Crisis Group report where it was it was stated “the political parties that exist
today in Rwanda are only tolerated if they agree not to question the definition of political life
drawn up by the RPF” (Reyntjens, 2004). Again, we see this pluralization of the political party
apparatus, but the validity is far from democratic and far from allowing dissenting opinions and
voices to be allowed. Political inclusion is a facade where ‘shadow parties,’ who align
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themselves with the RPF, do so without truly generating anything outside the ideological
monolith that is the RPF. While this specific work was generated ten years after the genocide
(2004), the country’s system hasn’t changed and has arguably become worse as new political
figures have emerged to challenge the Kageme regime. In the 2010 election, “opposition parties
such as the Democratic Green Party and the FDU-Inkingi party were prevented from registering
in the months leading up to the election; further, organizers of the FDU-Inkingi party were
subjected to physical violence when they attempted to register voters, with police officers
looking on” (Matfess, 2015), demonstrating the government’s grip as not only was this violence
observed by armed police forces, but tolerated and allowed. Furthermore, in a report drafted by
the BTI Transformation Index it was noted that “due to the exclusion of competing candidates
and political parties other than the RPF, the local councils and committees do not function as
organs of political participation, inclusion or power-sharing” (Anonymous, 2020).
Filip Reyntjens expands on this point of political repression further in his 2020 work
Rwanda. Reyntjens notes that political shake ups, as  have previously mentioned, specifically in
the cabinet (closest members to the president), as well as with political dissidents, are common
when perceived threats to the regime or counter-genocidal-narratives ensue and gain public
attention. Earlier in 2020, amidst the pandemic, “on 9 April Minister of State Olivier
Nduhungirehe was removed from office ‘for consistently acting based on personal opinions over
Government policies’” (Reyntjens, 2020). In a tweet, Nduhungirehe argued that “politicians who
were killed during the genocide should also be remembered” (Reyntjens, 2020), which resulted
in heavy backlash, arguably because it goes against the standard narrative of the genocide within
Rwanda. Lonzen Rugira, a writer and editor for the Rwandan based news source The New Times,
rebutted back against this comment, arguing “personal circumstances cannot be used to
29
undermine collective memory” (Reyntjens, 2020). What should be observed here is The New
Times, while it claims to be privately owned, originated in 1995 right after the genocide and
tends to be sponsored and supportive of the Kagame regime, outcasting those who recite any sort
of narrative against the RPF’s depiction of events that occurred from April through July of 1994.
Rugira later hinted at the fact that other political potentials, Victoire Ingabire (2010 political
opponent of Kagame), in the past have tried to recite a new narrative, allowing people to ‘mourn
their own.’ Ingabire ended up in a Rwandan prison with a sentence of fifteen years and has not
been allowed to leave the country without permission from the Minister of Justice, who has
refused to acknowledge her two requests. Her family remains in her exiled home, the
Netherlands, to which she has not seen in the last ten plus years. Ingabire, in an interview with
The Guardian, reflects on the difficulties of the Rwandan development model stating
“there is a pattern of limiting political participation to those
affiliated to the ruling party and excluding serious contenders in
Rwanda’s presidential elections. This is done by fabricating
charges and abusing the judicial system. These acts represent a
violation of Commonwealth core principles. They also challenge
the claim often advanced by the ruling circle in Rwanda that the
established political system is based on power-sharing consensus
democracy with the intent of overcoming ethnic divisions and
accelerating development” (Umuhoza, 2021).
This disarming of political opposition and those who go against the narrative is not isolated to
just the political world in Rwanda, but also in the military leadership as on “27 April, Kagame
removed General Patrick Nyamvumba from the post of Minister of Internal Security “owing to
matters of accountability under investigation” (Reyntjens, 2020). He was the shortest serving
military leader under the regime’s history and due to the fact of his short-term, Reyntjens
suggests that his treatment may have been due to issues within the military establishment and
Kagame, although this has yet to reveal itself to public news. Oustings are nothing new in
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Rwandan politics and, of course, these shake ups lead to open positions in which RPF/Tutsi
leadership are able to monopolize and dominate the political institutions within the country.
“As was the case in the past, the government’s composition
contravenes article 62 of the constitution which stipulates that a
party cannot have more than 50 percent of cabinet members.
However, out of a total of 31 members, the RPF holds 22 positions,
with the PSD having two and the PL one; five members have no
official party affiliation, and the affiliation of one other could not
be identified. A more covert way of controlling the government,
that has also been in use for many years, is that if a minister is not
a Tutsi of the RPF, the permanent secretary is (with just one
exception) a Tutsi of the RPF, thus offering a way of controlling
members considered “less reliable”. While they constitute under 15
per cent of the country’s population, Tutsi occupy 60 percent of
cabinet positions. In terms of both party political and ethnic
affiliation, these figures have remained relatively stable over the
last decade (Reyntjens, 2020).
Over Kagame’s time in office, his grip on the political machine inside Rwanda has
expanded, bringing in ethnic tendencies within the government. As Reyntjens notes, the majority
of political positions within the Rwandan government are held by the minority ethnic group, the
Tutsis, making us question whether much of these tensions have changed under Kagame’s
miracle country (see table below and appendix attached).
Table 1. Distribution on key offices - mid-2000
Institution Tutsi Hutu RPF/RPA Other Party/no
party/unknown
Government 12 8 11 9
Permanent
Secretaries
10 2 10 2
Provincial
Governors
9 3 11 1
Ambassadors 7 3 8 2







7 3 - -




17 5 18 4
Note: Table 1 in Rwanda: Ten Years After the Genocide; Reyntjens, F. (2004).
Rwanda, Ten Years on: From Genocide to Dictatorship. African Affairs, 103(411),
177–210. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3518608
Furthermore, this blatant disregard for human rights, demonstrated within democratic states
(freedom of speech, press, political affiliation etc) have been widely eliminated under Kagame
and the RPF, many times, as will be seen later, in brutally violent conflicts which have even
expanded to outside of the country. In an open letter written by the then executive director of
Human Rights Watch in Los Angeles, 2009, Kenneth Roth
“observed that even a government that does many good things does
not have license to ignore human rights when it finds them
inconvenient. Political pluralism, free expression, and genuinely
competitive elections are not optional in a genuine democracy, but
essential. He argued that no one should be allowed to manipulate
the 1994 genocide to play on the heartstrings of the international
community and thereby justify repression” (Roth, 2009).
Much of Roth’s observation echos the sentiments of the international guilt syndrome held by the
international community, specifically those in the west who delayed in coming to the aid of the
Rwandese during the genocide. This, in itself, has become not only a tactic of Kagame’s foreign
policy, but also a narrative that, when challenged, results in brutal repression within the state. A
lot of this narrative is engrained in the younger population in Rwanda through the application of
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the Ingando, or camps that are compulsory for civilians prior to university attendance. This
disturbing control over the narrative and state’s affairs through the Ingando is a practice that goes
back and reflects Matfess’s terms regarding developmental authoritarianism. However, while the
state attempts to control the mindset of the people through these camps and political practices, I
have found that more and more Rwandese are speaking out about the political exclusivity and the
danger it poses to maintaining development in Rwanda.
Indoctrination- Ingando:
Within the Rwandan development criteria, especially Kagame’s 2020 Vision, (which has
now been moved to in light of the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact on the economy) came the
concept of Ingando, which the government claims is “ is simply an updated version of a
Rwandan tradition ….the idea of using ingando to cultivate reconciliation in Rwanda was born
of meetings at Urugwiro State House in the years following the genocide.”(Mgbako, 2005). The
word itself derives from the country’s language, kinyarwandan, the verb “kuganika, which refers
to a process in which the elders of a community would leave the distractions of their daily lives
and retreat to places of isolation to solve problems of national concern such as war, famine,
drought, and the expansion of the nation's borders (Mgbako, 2005). Additionally, while in line
with the country’s cultural and ethnic roots, the goal of the project was also part of the
reconciliation process that began after the horrors of the genocide. However, while this idea of
reconciliation and cultural unity seems great, and in many ways is important to the country’s
bond, the true purpose, having been documented and accounted for by government officials and
militants, is far more political in nature and meant to serve the strengthening and progression of
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Paul Kagame and the RPF. It also eludes back to our discussion on how authoritarians operate
using control of public opinion over violence.
The state-run mass mobilization effort of Ingando, are camps that are coordinated and run
throughout the country and have been “alternatively known as ‘solidarity camps,’ ‘re-education
camps,’ civic education camps,’ ‘political awareness camps,’ reorientation camps,’ and
reintegration courses’” (Matfess, 2015). Originally, the target of these camps was mainly at
former militants, returning Tutsis and government leaders following the genocide, but it seems
clear today that the goal of the RPF is to have mandatory attendance for all students before
attending university. “In a series of interviews with government administrators in January, 2014,
a number of officials stated that part of the government’s vision for 2020 is that all citizens will
have attended Ingando” (Matfess, 2015).
But what exactly are these camps and what happens inside? From interviews with
officials and those who have attended Ingando “the camps themselves are modeled after military
training camps that the RPF established while based in Uganda” (Matfess, 2015), prior to the
genocide. As Chi Adanna Mgbako describes
Ingando is more likely a pre-war RPF creation aimed at grassroots
mobilization for RPF campaigns. From 1990 to 1993, the RPF
installed participants in ingandos or "RPF schools" for three
weeks, after which participants would be expected to return to their
villages and disseminate pro-RPF ideology.  This RPF practice
may have occurred in Uganda and the RPF-controlled territories in
Rwanda. In addition, the RPF, whose ideological mentor is Yoweri
Museveni of Uganda, may have modeled ingando on solidarity
camps in Uganda (Mgbako, 2005).
The daily structure of the camps follows a rigid schedule, including exercise and lectures from
government officials. Opposing thoughts to the RPF ideology are not tolerated within the camps
and according to Mgbako the lectures are composed almost entirely of RPF representatives.
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Today the concept of Ingando has expanded to other areas of Rwanda. Judges within the Gacaca
courts, community leaders, women’s groups, church leaders and students are all targeted with the
goal of highlighting “the defects of the genocidal regime, and lessons on present government
programs and policies that stress the ‘democratic’ elements of the current government” (Mgbako,
2005). As seen, the RPF has made it just about compulsory to attend these camps in which
indoctrination into RPF ideology can be mandated, controlled and distributed amongst the
population. The narrative of current politics, the genocide, Paul Kagame and the runnings of the
country are tightly controlled within these camps and spread a sort of manipulation throughout
the country, stressing democratic tendencies, yet enforcing a certain narrative to follow. Not only
is there little separation from within the country’s political foundation, but there is also little
separation, so it seems, amongst the people and the executive’s ideology on how the country
should operate. While democratic tendencies can be ‘stressed’ within these camps, and publicly
acknowledged, the Ingando demonstrates Kagame’s dire need to control the narrative amongst
his own people. Over and over, the government has publicly stated the intentions for these camps
are for state unity and reconciliation, however, former participants stated in anonymous
interviews that “outsiders say ingando is a way of attracting the youth to the Rwandan Patriotic
Front...But if you feel that way in this country, you must keep silent” (Matfess, 2015).
In addition to citizens, people in office and position, the RPF has also heavily targeted
ex-combatants who have fought in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the Congo
Wars (1996-1997/ 1998-2002). In summary, this conflict was a result of past tensions between
the two countries, but was primarily sparked by the exodus of Tutsis fleeing Rwanda during the
1994 genocide and Hutus fleeing the country once the RPF army, under Kagame, took control in
fear of retalation. Within the DRC, infighting began within the refugee camps located along the
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border of the DRC and Rwanda between Tutsi and Hutu refugees. Furthermore, the RPF made
brutal advances into the Congo, aiming to hunt down génocidaires responsible for committing
acts during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, leading to a what is reffered to “revenge genocide,”
which has sparked international outrage amongst human rights groups, but tends to not be
acknowledged by global leaders. This march into the Congo led to brutal and violent measures
taken at the order of Kagame and, to this day, still holds an uneasy border tension between the
two countries. It is amongst those who were mobilized to fight in the Congo, and their
subsequent de-mobilization, where Kagame’s authoritarian control used within the ingando can
be seen yet again.
As Chi Adanna Mgbako describes in her work Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation
and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda Note, “it is presently compulsory for
ex-RPF, ex-FAR who did not flee to Congo, and ex-combatants who fought in Congo (ex-Armed
Groups) to attend ingando camps as a pre-demobilization, pre-discharge orientation program”
(Mgbako, 2005). Similarly to the citizen and political population in Rwanda, ingando preaches a
very specific narrative regarding the RPF, Kagame and the political measures taken within the
country in order to re-integrate ex-combatants back into society with a matching and positive
view of current RPF doctrine. Additionally, the ingando camps, along with financial reparations
are also being offered to ex-rebels and génocidaires as well as the government states “if it does
not assist these rebels in peaceful resettlement they will revitalize the insurgency” (Mgbako,
2005). Along the lines of reintegration, it does seem vital and a positive step forward to try and
reintroduce combatants (on both sides) back into society, however, as noted
People working in the nongovernmental sector compare ingando
with other ‘unity and reconciliation’ activities saying ‘ingando is
different, it is more political.’ Ingando are indeed fundamentally
political, not only because i) politics and specific policies are being
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taught (‘in ingando the government makes its programme being
known’), or because ii) convergence and ‘defence’ of policies
ushers support to ruling party, thus solidifying its grasp on power;
but also because iii) the state takes a keen interest in these specific
groups and their ‘forming,’ re-working, essentially their wholesale
transformation, into an ‘ideal citizen’ (Purdeková, 2011).
As Purdeková notes, the ‘ideal citizen’ is one that is molded and formed according to RPF
ideology, an ideology that dictates the thoughts and values of the population, which in turn can
shape the national discourse. The results of this are an overwhelming support for the monolithic
vision that is the RPF and its unseparated legislative and judicial control within the country. As
ingando becomes compulsory, so too does the state’s absolute vision and control, thus, arguing
the point that freedoms guaranteed within democracies indeed do not exist within this
indoctrination apparatus, but an authoritarian control over the minds of the nation’s constituents,
which has undoubtedly led to a uniform vision about what development means and looks like for
the country. Overall, the nation’s constituents are supportive of Kagame and his work as it
resembles progress from what was to the development success of what is. But with this
development, as we can see, comes the sacrifice of individual freedoms and liberties of thought
and mind. While this can, and has in the short term, lended to Rwanda’s ability to stay relatively
peaceful, in the long run, especially with social media platforms exploding within the country
and more dissenting voices being able to be heard, will this not spark change? Will this not
question Kagame’s benevolence?
Amartya Sen discusses the imperative point of social interactions within development
and how they are imperative to its success. Sen notes that “the politics of social consensus calls
not only for acting on the basis of given individual preferences, but also for the sensitivity of
social decisions to the development of individual preference and norms...in this context
particular importance has to be attached to the role of public discussion and interactions in the
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emergence of shared values and commitments” (Sen, 1998). This is an excellent point to stress
and points out the fallacious comments from the government about reintegration and
reconciliation: if the public discourse is compulsory attendance to ingando, which in turns
morphs the individual’s mindset to be in line with the ruling party’s doctrine despite truths, does
this in turn actually create a system that is sensitive to the development of individual preference
within the country? From a development standpoint, and in regard to the necessity of democratic
freedoms within developing countries, it seems to create a conundrum in the state of Rwanda.
These mandatory indoctrinations, while creating a sense of ‘unity;’ which has in turn brought the
country’s population on board with Kagame’s vision for economic development (which on paper
has occurred), have come at the cost of social liberties and freedoms which has created an “us”
versus “them” mentality amongst the population, a mentality that helped lend itself to the
atrocities in 1994. While ethnic identification in the country has been pushed aside following the
genocide, and it being the roots of it, it has been replaced by the concept of being either in line
with the government’s rule and narrative or fear, repression and potential violence for those who
stray away.
The treatment of people within ingando and those who have refused it has been widely
reported on. In the Immigrartion and Refugee Report of Canada, Rwanda: Information on
ingando camps, including organization, structure, programs and participation; instances of
human rights violations in the camps it was reported in 2013 that “14 men and 2 women fled
Rwanda and sought asylum in Uganda, claiming they had experienced "harassment by officials''
for refusing to attend an ingando program in Butare, 80 kilometres from Kigali ... The students
claimed that as a result of their refusal to participate in the program, authorities withheld their
high school examination results'' (Anonymous,2014). Upon more investigation, the students
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reported how many of their friends who had attended the camps were pressured to join military
groups, specifically M23, a Rwandan backed rebel group in the Congo. Out of this fear, the
students claimed they wished not to attend the camps for fear of military service as “most of their
friends who went there never came back” (2014). Another report from a 25 year old masters
student  “who attended ingando in 2008 said that the program ‘taught us how to contribute as
soldiers, not as intellectuals'’” (2014). The brutality of the camps, having been established in a
military like format, saw the usage of beatings, sometimes with a whip, to ensure obedience
within the camps.
When it comes to the impact of ingando, one student in a report Rwanda’s Ingando
camps Liminality and the reproduction of power, a “student suggested, ‘I don’t think that
[ingando creates reconciliation]. You can show people that you agree, but in your head you think
another thing... You cannot tell it because otherwise you will be imprisoned” (Purdeková, 2011).
In another report a researcher noted
When these kids go through ingando, something happens, there is a
feeling of fear [in them], they are only afraid of the challenges, of
history, [they] know only of the government's programme. That is
why I hate them [ingando], I never went to visit one, but I can see
the outcomes. There are no demands, they demand nothing, there
are no demonstrations, no strikes at universities, I keep thinking
this must be the result of ingando. Another result, and you cannot
observe it because you are not Rwandan, if you meet former
soldiers, prisoners, former ingando trainees, even in family
context, and you start to criticise or to have contradictory opinions,
they just laugh a little and say nothing, whether Hutu or Tutsi it
does not matter, nothing, no opinion. (Purdeková, 2011).
This quote acknowledges our point regarding social politics and the ability to discuss and create
unity from an organic place rather than an enforced ideological narrative. While I cannot back
the notion with fully grounded evidence that the lack of strikes of opposition comes from the
‘brain washing’ narrative that is pursued amongst the ingando camps, it can certainly be seen,
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from the accounts listed, that it can be inferred and perhaps correlated at the least. As Purdeková
notes the “Ingando’s effects thus can be seen from a different angle, a much more politicised
one... Ingando can be seen as a key tool in, and a microcosm of, the wider political project of
governmentality and social engineering” (Purdeková, 2011). However, as new voices arise
within and outside the country, it must be asked how long this program’s effect can last.
Indoctrination 2.0- The Gacaca Court System
The concept of social engineering to maintain a monolithic narrative does not stop, nor
end, at the ingando camps or through oppressive measures as I will examine when looking at the
press, both domestic and foreign, in Rwanda. After the genocide, a court system was established
in Rwanda to handle the reconciliation process within the country and pursue a pathway to
moving forward after the atrocity. The Gacaca court system was promoted as a “Rwandan
solution to a Rwandan problem; the claim that large numbers of foreign journalists were not what
was required, and that justice in Rwanda would be done by Rwandans” (Matfess, 2015).
Additionally, due to the sheer volume of perpetrators (genocidaires) the justice system had to
take on, the courts were established as a way to handle this massive influx to the country’s
redeveloping judicial apparatus. From an international point of view, it should be noted that this
would seem a good step in the right direction: a country taking on this issue in its own way
should be noted and acknowledged as a positive step forward into bringing the country back
together after such horrible events occurred. It even hints at notions of democratic change within
the country, to allow the citizens a pathway to forgiveness, reconciliation and reintegration back
into society. In fact, “Rwanda’s Gacaca courts have long been held up by their proponents as a
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model for successful, post-conflict reconciliation efforts” (Seay, 2017).  In the aftermath of the
genocide, while most of the main leaders of the genocide went to the International Crimnal
Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR), located in Arusha Tanzania, Rwandan’s solution was the traditional
court system of Gacaca, consisting of “12,000 community-based courts that sought to try
genocide criminals while promoting forgiveness by victims, ownership of guilt by criminals, and
reconciliation in communities as a way to move forward” (Seay, 2017).
Upon a closer examination, however, we find an unsettling truth of more social
engineering constructed by the Tutsi dominated RPF, and the “development of an approved
official narrative of the genocide” (Matfess, 2015). In other words, the “gacaca process was far
more political and much less conciliatory than the casual observer might want to believe” (Seay,
2017). From its genesis, the Gacaca system was utilized in delineating a strict system of ‘what
happened in Rwanda’ and what absolutely did not. As stated, reconciliation within the ingando
system heavily promoted and, in other words, forced Rwandans to be educated in a certain way
regarding the genocide and how to think about it. The Gacaca system, similarly, has been used to
promote this exact ideology, but instead of being aimed at the youth Rwandans, it was aimed at
those involved in the genocide or those who think outside the borders of thought process when it
comes to the narrative. As one government official from Southwestern Rwanda involved in
unification and sensitization stated in an interview
The goal is to make people have the same opinions. It is very
important that people in Rwanda think the same way because we
need unity in this country. What we hope to achieve is that after a
meeting, 75 percent of the people leave with the same mindset.
Those people will also talk about what they have heard with other
people, so that we will reach almost the entire population (Matfess,
2015).
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Unity and legitimacy dominate the Gacaca system and how the RPF maintained its dominance in
the country via judicial process. If people think the same, questions will be minimal or easy to
dismiss, but of course this is incredibly dangerous to any sort of democratic foundation within a
developing country and is, in essence, no different than historical tyrants controlling the official
party narrative within their respective countries; Joseph Stalin’s promotion of Leninist
communism or the Kim Dynasty of North Korea being some examples. Facts were distorted and
those who deviated away, in many cases, disappeared.
Arguably, the courts do achieve a sense of justice throughout the country by utilizing the
system, which incorporates Rwandan cultural and traditional roots, but it's the manner in which it
was used that articulates autocratic rule in the country rather than a judicial system abiding by
democratic principles. In her book Investing in Authoritarian Rule: Punishment and Patronage
in Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts for Genocide Crimes, Anuradha Chakravarty elabortes on the
politics behind the Gacaca, explaining “the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF),
used gacaca courts as a tool of patronage to build the new, post-genocide government’s
legitimacy, which in turn allowed the RPF to entrench its rule into the virtually unchallenged
authoritarian system in Rwanda today” (Chakravarty, 2015). In fact, while the RPF’s beginnings
are rooted in horrific violence and brutal repression, both domestically and abroad, specifically
in the Congo, Chakravarty explains how, over time, the Gacaca system became a sort of mutual
benefit between the Tutsi dominated RPF and the Hutu majority. Rather than resorting to violent
means or repression, as many totalitarian rulers do, Kagame and the RPF used the courts as a
way to promote and solidify their rule by enforcing the narrative upon those in the courts and
using them as the promotional tool. She writes
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In denouncing others, submitting self-incriminating confessions,
and judging their friends and co-ethnics, thousands upon thousands
of individual Hutu acted upon and enforced RPF rules, reinforcing
the regime with their cooperation in exchange for reduced
sentences, security guarantees, the possibility of private gains in
the form of personal vengeance or economic windfalls, and
opportunities to access public power and social prestige. The RPF
unleashed a stream of individualized benefits and sanctions that
made “opportunistic investors” of ordinary Hutu who backed RPF
rule in their own interests (Chakravarty, 2015).
Can this really be considered true justice? Furthermore, how stable is a system like this and how
does it impact the democratic development process of a country like Rwanda? Of course, those
who deviate from the official narrative “which stresses national unity to the point of obscuring
continued inequality and tensions between Hutu and Tutsi, can result in imprisonment” (Matfess,
2015). As noted, leaders such Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza, who started a new political party, the
United Democratic Forces of Rwanda (UDF-Inkingi) to challenge Kagame in 2010, was
sentenced to eight years in prison and later, when appealing the case to the higher courts, fifteen
years, demonstrating the amount of executive control the party’s leader has over the entire
governmental system and those who dare to run against or challenge its authority. In more
extreme cases we have seen the murder of challengers such as “vice-president of the Democratic
Green Party, André Kagwa Rwisereka, who was murdered in 2010 and the former head of
intelligence, Patrick Karegeya, who was murdered in 2013” (Umohoza, 2021). It seems very
clear that a country which stresses the idea of democratic values, especially checks and balances
within the set up of the governing body, the RPF and Kagame maintain an iron fist on those it
feels are outside the molding of contemporary Rwandan thinking. This, of course, only generates
a system of fear and absolute obedience to the narrative.
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Indeed, the Gacaca courts, as well as other courts in Rwanda, have indeed expressed and
promoted RPF autocratic rule within the country and while the results of the Gacaca system
have indeed entrenched authoritarian rule within the country, it is important to acknowledge, as
Chakravarty explains, that this perhaps wasn’t the intention. Following the RPF victory in Kigali
on July 4th, 1994, and the establishment of these courts throughout Rwanda, Hutus and those
involved in the genocide, really had few options in regard to how to move forward with in the
country post the genocide. It seems clear that the options were to either flee the country, which in
many cases resulted in brutal, retaliatory violence by invading RPF soldiers in the Congo, or face
the court system. Thus, it’s very clear that as Rwanda emerged from the horrors of the genocide
the “RPF was the only option for any Hutu seeking to gain better status or avoid worse
punishment for crimes, those Hutus had no choice but to work within the RPF’s system of
patronage, but this did not mean that most Hutus accepted ‘that the RPF were legitimate rulers
with the requisite clean hands’” (Seay, 2017). That being said, we see that not only was the
narrative inducted into the minds of Rwandans going through Gacaca, but also involved
pursuing genocidaires who weren’t participants in the genocide at all. Chakravarty continues
with this stating the incentives offered to Hutus through Gacaca “led to negative outcomes for
many Rwandans, particularly those who were falsely accused of participation in genocide...faced
with competing loyalties to different family and clan members alongside the need to demonstrate
commitment to the gacaca courts, made decisions about whom to denounce and at what times to
do so” (Seay, 2017). While on a local level within the country, Gacaca has maintained forms of
local peace between those who perpetrated and those who were victims of the genocide, it falls
on a double-edge sword of justice that is maintained by authoritarian rule. Thus, it must be asked
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how stable and long lasting is this justice, especially when the political, legislative and judicial
structure are dominated by the party that enforced the Gacaca indoctrination?
The Gacaca system, while perhaps initially intended to seek out justice within Rwanda
and provide a judicial route to reconciliation, actually created a path to a more solidified
autocratic regime. The courts have been used to induct Rwandans into a specific way of thinking
and, creating a sort of governmental facilitated, social engineering experiment which in many
cases, created a justice system that has actually pushed those with their own opinions or political
challenges into prison or worse, death. It is within these institutions that we blatantly see the lack
of true civil, judicial and political, democratic development in Rwanda. In Senian thought,
development is measured through the amount of freedoms individuals have within a society.
However, when going through Sen’s list of imperative freedoms in regard to development, under
the RPF rule, Rwanda falls short in many ways. Political freedoms are out of the question as
demonstrated by those who challenge Kagame for leadership in Rwanda. Social freedoms and
security guarantees are, in many ways, stripped unless you fall within the narrative. Freedom of
thought exists in Rwanda, but only in the shadows or within one’s head. Those who speak out of
line risk the wrath of the ruling elite. While it must be acknowledged that Rwanda’s Gacaca did
develop a system of justice, that very system has also helped to plunge the country deeper into
authoritarianism. But when examining this in regard to our question of the necessity of
democracy, how should this be answered? While perhaps the system is plagued with issues that,
from a western point of view, would seem damming, does this actually insist that the country is
worse off?
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Deviating from the Story: Disappearances, press suppression and international
condemnation.
As I have explored, Rwanda’s judicial practices and social engineering systems are the
manifestors of the official narrative and definition of contemporary Rwandan thought in regard
to the history of the country as well as how it should look moving forward. Perhaps put a little
differently, Kagame and the RPF have made it very clear as to what it takes to be within the ‘in’
part of society as well as demonstrated the consequences to those who do not fit that mold.
Domestically, there is a uniformity that all must fall into. A monolith of reasoning and thought
that allows the country to move forward. The lack of separation of the “democratic” institutions
from the executive in Rwanda has created a country where “ the Rwandan people know that to
survive in such an environment, and to benefit from any government- or foreign-funded aid, they
must be loyal to their president” (Sundaram, 2014). Let us be very clear: I am not saying
Rwandans are incapable of having social and civil  freedoms. Quite the contrary, it is the fact that
Rwandans, out of fear of harm from deviating from the nationalistic emphasis engrained in them
through the ingando or gacaca, are unable to freely speak their mind. It is within these
institutions that the very question of this paper comes into focus. Controlling the historic
narrative of a nation, and condemning and punishing those who question it, is dangerous and, as
history has shown with other historic dictatorial leaders, extremely unstable in the long run.
While asking about the integrity of democracy in development, we see that Rwanda
demonstrates a case of a ruse democracy, which analogously has a sort of gilded appeal. On the
surface, Rwanda oozes what international leaders, specifically in the democratic west, want to
see: a nation rise out of the ashes of a horrible atrocity and take on democracy as its development
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model. However, as beautiful and wanted as this is, it simply isn’t the case. Underneath the
darling that is Rwanda lurks a regime that will do what it must to command the minds of those it
rules over. While there has been great success within the country’s economic growth (a common
point noted and attributed to Kagame’s rule), it must be questioned as to how long this can
actually last and whether or not this growth is based on the actual implementation of economic
practices through Kagame’s leadership or foreign aid dependence. The latter of these points will
be a major discussion later in this work, articulating the true nature and fundamentals of how
Kagame financially operates the country.
In the international sector, Kagame has been questioned in regard to his role on human
rights, or lack thereof,  and how, in addition to his overall rule within the country, this
contributed to legitimize his “democratic” rule over the country. As discovered, those who defer
from the narrative of Kagame’s Rwanda have seen the wrath of Kagame first-hand, but it is also
important to understand how Kagame presents his role to both the domestic and international
media. Indoctrinatization practices, as I have analyzed, have been widely used throughout the
country, but so too has a suppression of the press, which has been widely seen as a tool to further
emphasize the narrative story. The expert use of suppressing or dominating the press is what I
will be exploring next as it helps to emphasize our discussion regarding international knowledge
of how Kagame rules and details the paradigm of foreign aid in development, an aid that
Kagame is more than addicted to. Kagame’s international title as the “darling tyrant” is no secret
to foreign leaders as international headlines in human rights magazines and foriegn journals have
documented this clearly throughout his rule, yet foreign aid still makes its way into the country,
and consistently. Why? In this section, I will examine how Kagame handles the press and uses
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his status as the “development darling” to articulate and, perhaps, redefine how democracy is
understood in non-western, economic terms.
In February, 2019, in a speech, Paul Kagame gave a warning to his online critics stating
“they are close to the fire” and one day “the fire will burn them” (Mudge, 2020). As technology
advances and the ability to access online platforms such as YouTube, Instagram and Twitter
make their way throughout Rwanda’s virtually connected audiences, so too does a new form of
political dissidence that, as seen, Kagame has publicly warned not to go too far into. Though
technology advances, the tactics do not as suppression or control of the press is very much the
same as suppression of political opponents who criticize Kagame’s thin skinned leadership and
has been a trend even since his first years in office. As early as 2001, one year into Kagame’s
first term as president, early reports from French papers came out analyzing the situation of the
press in Rwanda noting “reporters from Sans Frontieres described Kagame as ‘a predator of
press freedom’ and noted that only one weekly, Umuseso, was ‘relatively independent”
(Reyntjens, 2004). Upon the release of this report, one of the journalists from Umuseso went into
exile while two others were jailed, portraying a country, early on in its development, where those
who criticize or point out the flaws face only fear and punishment. In recent years, the same acts
have occurred with others in the country as well. In 2019, Human Rights Watch reported 
“Eugène Ndereyimana, an opposition member with the unregistered Forces démocratiques
unifiées (FDU)-Inkingi party was reported missing by his colleagues on July 15, 2019 after he
failed to arrive for a meeting in Nyagatare, in Rwanda’s Eastern Province” (Anonymous, 2019).
In another case in the same year, HRW reported another missing reporter, “Constantin
Tuyishimire, a journalist with TV1 Rwanda who covers northern Rwanda, was reported missing
on July 16 while he was supposed to be on a reporting trip to Gicumbi District” (Anonymous,
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2019). In the same report, Lewis Mudge, the Central African Director of Human Rights Watch,
stated that this is yet another in a long line of disappearances in the last year, advocating for the
authorities to conduct a transparent investigation of these disappearances as it seems they were
politically motivated. While we could sit here and list disappearances and mysterious murders of
political dissidents, the point here is to elaborate on the unstable political situation this is creating
in Rwanda from a development standpoint.
2020 shaped up to be an extremely difficult year for the globe and, of course, developing
nations had not only the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, but also the challenges of
development where Rwanda is no exception. As technology has boomed and allowed for more
freedom of thought and, most importantly, expression, the Rwandan government has found itself
in a more difficult stronghold regarding how it deals with suppressing those who deviate from
the enforced narrative. In the last year, as the pandemic swept across Rwanda, even reporting on
the facts and effects of the pandemic could result in severe legal punishment if it demonstrated
that the Rwandan government had some pitfalls. As Lewis Mudge documented in a Human
Rights Watch article,
Reporting on apparently innocuous – yet critically important –
topics like growing poverty under the Covid-19 lockdown, or the
eviction of vulnerable populations from poor neighborhoods of
Kigali, the capital, can land you in jail. Dieudonné Niyonsenga,
also known as Cyuma Hassan, was the latest victim of the
Rwandan authorities’ thin-skinned approach to criticism. He was
accused of a range of fabricated offenses including impersonating a
journalist. Niyonsenga and his driver faced a year-long trial before
being acquitted (Mudge, 2021).
Mudge further reported on the growing influence of YouTube as a major platform for criticisms
against the Rwandan government during the COVID-19 Pandemic, citing the mysterious
disappearance of Innocent Bahati:
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On February 9, 2021, Innocent Bahati, a 31-year-old singer and
poet, was reported missing to the Rwanda Investigation Bureau
(RIB), two days after he was last seen in Nyanza, Southern
Province. His poems, which he recites in videos posted on
YouTube, have focused on social issues such as growing poverty or
criticism of the lockdown and its impact. Two people who saw him
before he disappeared told Human Rights Watch that he had
traveled to Nyanza district on February 7 to research material for a
new poem. The RIB spokesperson told the media an investigation
into his whereabouts was ongoing. Several sources said that Bahati
was previously detained in 2017 for criticizing the decision to
move the Kigali Institute of Education campus from Kigali to
Rukara, Eastern Province. Given Bahati’s previous detention, his
recent criticism of government policies, and the pattern of
mysterious disappearances of government critics in Rwanda, his
disappearance should be treated as suspicious, Human Rights
Watch said (Mudge, 2021).
As seen from the series of demonstrated accounts, Kagame and the RPF’s iron first on Rwanda is
clearly evident, but is also being exposed to those in the social media community. Those who
sway away from indoctrination, the monolith ideology of the genocide or push back against RPF
political moves find themselves in dangerous and, sometimes, violent situations. Yet, with all of
this acknowledged, Rwanda still remains a development darling and a beacon of democracy
within western thought. Why? I have demonstrated and shown that Rwanda, while having gilded
democratic institutions, underneath the surface, is truly an autocracy ruled over by Kagame and
the RPF who aim to create a uniform way of thinking across the country regardless of social
freedoms being in tact. This, and the actions discussed, go against all Senian thought on
democracy and freedoms that are considered needed for countries to develop. Yet, Rwanda
averages seven percent growth and is “one of the leading African countries in economic growth.
According to official figures, its investments in agriculture, energy, infrastructure, mining and
tourism have lifted more than one million people out of poverty” (Anonymous, 2019). The
country has strived towards gender equality where “sixty-two per cent of parliamentarians, fifty
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per cent of ministers and forty-four per cent of officials in the judiciary are women”
(Anonymous, 2019). Within the educational sector, over 600,000 laptops have been delivered
throughout the country and over 80% of the country is covered by a form of health insurance.
Surely, these are positive developments, are they not?
In our final section, I will examine how the international community has helped Rwanda
become this development darling while ignoring the blatant human rights violations. I will
examine the funding that goes into maintaining RPF power and limiting political diversity, the
goal here being to demonstrate that, yes, while an autocrat has maintained power and control
over the country, much of the funding that has been put into developing Rwanda isn’t actually
from Rwanda. Furthermore, I will demonstrate that the successful economic statistics claimed by
Rwanda have, in recent reports, being dubbed as fraudulent, thus, bringing to the spotlight the
questionable longevity of this authoritarian regime.
The last point to demonstrate in this research is that democracy isn’t necessarily needed
in order for a country to receive financial aid for development, but it is in the country’s interest to
maintain the look of democracy, which Rwanda has done quite successfully. Although, in many
ways, this has also pushed dissidents within the country to advocate for massive democratic
reform within the country, creating a socio-political and economic situation that makes us
question how long an authoritarian regime like Kagame’s can maintain its grip on power. It is
here that we see the true enigma that is development and how democracy is more of something
that should theatrically appear, in a political guise-sense, for aid, but is not imperative for the
country to create development within itself- rather, as in the case of Rwanda, this has created a
aid dependency on the international community, a community that is now also , in a sort of
indirect way, responsible for lack of social freedoms in the country. So approaching our final
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section it must be asked: in Rwanda, what is the role of democracy and how has development
occurred in spite of the fact that autocracy reigns supreme in the country?
Borrowing, aid, reports,  development and sustainability:
It should be of no surprise that supporting autocracies, especially those in favor with
western interests, is not out of the question when it comes to democratic leaders who support
developing nations. Especially for someone like Paul Kagame who, through his leadership, has
transformed Rwanda “from a Third World backwater into a prospective middle-income country”
(Mailafia, 2017), a feat not easy in the developing world. While critics and reports, including this
one, have highlighted the ruses of the country’s democracy, including the fact that it ranks 160th
of 189 countries in the UN development index, it is still undeniable that mass progress has been
made within the country’s ability to develop rapidly after the 1994 tragedy. But how is this
possible? In many ways, Kagame has been compared to other historic leaders who have used
autocratic methods to develop their country, the most prominent being the Lee Thesis from
Singapore. However, while I have argued that modern autocrats tend to focus on controlling the
language and mind set of a people, which Kagame does and continues to do successfully, he also
uses much more crude and obvious tactics to sway those from going against him. Nonetheless,
Kagame remains a paradox in the international community due to his methods, but also the
results he produces from the international community.
Rwanda is labeled as one of the most competitive, liberal and open economies in Africa,
with land and health reforms seen across the country, attracting the eye of neoliberal,
international institutions and countries alike. Technocrats and powerful leaders such as Bill Gates
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and Bill Clinton have all commented on Kagame’s leadership and the success he has brought to
the nation. While it is true, and this paper isn’t arguing against the successes that have happened,
on the contrary, the whole focus of this paper is to analyze the role of democracy in development
and Rwanda has demonstrated a case of exactly that while at the same time pushing away basic
human and civil rights. However, what should be examined and included in the discussion is the
role of the international community when it comes to the development seen in Rwanda today and
how this may demonstrate that Rwanda’s autocratic leadership is not as responsible for as much
of the development as many think- at least when it comes to the financial aid and support that
Rwanda is given.
As I have discussed, the role of international guilt regarding the 1994 genocide,
according to professor Reynjentes, is a huge part of the lack of condemnation regarding civil and
social freedoms from other democratic nations. However, I would argue the ability for Rwanda
to have such a hold on the international, democratic community is not a new phenomena, but it is
also based on how they appear to the community. While in this paper I have shown time and time
again the lack of political, civil, human, and democratic rights guaranteed in the country, that
does not prove that Rwanda is incapable of interacting with western democracies, and
successfully receiving massive amounts of funding. As Michaella Mattes and Mariana Rodriguez
state in their work Autocracies and International Cooperation, “while democracies domestic
processes’ are conducive to their success in international cooperation, autocracies would seem to
be challenged....yet is important to recognize that not all autocracies are equally disadvantaged”
(Mattes, Rodriguez, 2014). In their work, Mattes and Rodriguez measure the cooperation ability
between personalist dictatorships, military regimes and democracies from 1990-2014. Their
results were “autocracies that more closely resemble democracies in the institutional
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characteristics that have been found to be important for cooperation (that is, greater leader
accountability, limited policy flexibility, and greater transparency) should be more successful at
cooperation and thus more likely to cooperate with one another and with democracies” (Mattes,
Ridriguez, 2014). Using this information, Rwanda fits this mold in many ways. While the
suppression of rights and political freedoms is common, their appearance as a democracy, with a
check and balanced government, constitutionally guaranteed rights and their established
institutions helps to pull in the international community. I would argue this, along with
Reynjentes explanation of international guilt, are key factors in Rwanda’s title as a development
darling and its praise from the democratic west. In other words, Rwanda checks off the
‘democratic nation’ checkbox through their appearance rather than their actual practices; thus,
the country receives higher amounts of international funding than many other developing
countries within its geographic area.
So, we know that Rwanda checks off the ability to look democratic, but does this mean
their development is organic and from within or is this development more so based on the
international funding received? As a nation, the country has focused much of its dependence for
domestic financial capabilities on the international community rather than from within. While
“economic growth has been high in Rwanda, it is characterised by low per capita income, low
private investment, low exports and high reliance on aid” (Umuhoza, 2021). As the country grew
through 2010-2020 so too did its borrowing as, according to the International Monetary Fund, it
increased its “indebtedness to 66% of GDP in 2020” (Louis, 2020). Even prior to the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic, the country was already struggling and taking on higher amounts of debt,
which of course just puts more strain on the economy.
Prior to Covid-19, Rwanda had a cash gap of 15.7% of
GDP a year to meet its sustainable development goals by 2030.
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This has increased to 21.3% of GDP per year. Given that its
government was provided with significant financial assistance to
support its development plan to transform Rwanda into a
middle-income state over the past two decades, and has not
succeeded, I would argue that any further financing must be
accompanied by radical governance reforms. Current governance
in Rwanda – that limits political space, lacks separation of power,
impedes freedom of expression and represses critics of the
government – cannot lead to sustainable development. (Umuhoza,
2021)
Of course, with the oncoming of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, the country has
struggled immensely and the main economic challenges of  “an undeveloped private sector,
increasing unproductive indebtedness, high youth unemployment and a consistently high poverty
rate, as well as a population happiness deficit” (Umuhoza, 2021) will continue to rock the
country if it is not stabilized in the following years.
Rwanda borrows a lot from the international community. In fact, around “30-40% of the
budget – still comes from aid” (Anonymous, 2021). In a Systematic Country Diagnostic,
conducted by the World Bank in 2019, Rwanda’s performance, in comparison to other nations
with a similar GDP per capita  in the area, was abysmal. The report noted “Rwanda also appears
to have relatively higher poverty than neighbouring peers with similar income per capita”
(Anonymous, 2019). Currently, the country ranks 142 of 157 countries on the Human Capital
Index, the predictor of poverty measurement. In fact, within this category, Rwanda was out
performed by its neighbor, Burundi: a nation currently experiencing conflict and war.
Continuing, “more than 70 percent of adults at the 40th percentile of population distribution or
below (B40) have only incomplete primary or no schooling at all” (World Bank, 2019). Poor
roads and infrastructure have made it difficult to connect the country and, from an open market
point of view, the biggest domestic investor in the country is the RPF owned Crystal Ventures, a
company noted to have $500 million in assets. The company handles everything from finance to
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furniture, is the largest milk processor in the country, and handles the distribution of most coffee
and pricy real estate throughout. Its only rival is a similar company named Horizon, which is
responsible to the Ministry of Defence, a department dominated by the RPF. Over their years of
investment, “Crystal Ventures and Horizon both get cushy government deals which mask the
failures of their enterprises, several of which are said to be loss-making” (Anonymous, 2017). In
an interview with former RPF presidential advisor, David Himabara (now living in exile) “they
monopolise but they don’t deliver on development” (Anonymous, 2017). In the same interview it
was noted
To critics, the firm is the business wing of an authoritarian elite. It
funded half of the party’s election campaign in 2010. It sold a subsidiary
in 2002 after UN experts accused it of trading in conflict minerals in the
Congolese war. The business purpose for two private jets that are allegedly
leased by Crystal Ventures to the president, Paul Kagame (pictured), is
unclear (Anonymous, 2017).
As can be seen, even in the open market, corruption and authoritarian control run deep
and have produced little results to development as backed up by the World Bank Report.
Potential foreign investors who have worked in Rwanda acknowledge that “poor, unfair, and
unstable regulations and exempting specific companies from regulation” (World Bank, 2019)
have contributed to less foreign direct investment from companies. Furthermore, with Kagame’s
control on the market via his investment firm, the monopolization is a deterrent for many
companies who wish to operate in the region and with the country. While proponents argue that it
is good for a government, especially after a cataclysmic event such as the 1994 genocide, to
control and operate the financing of the country, it is also good to know when to let the private
sector in as “in the long run, creating such an extraordinary overlap between political and
commercial power is dangerous” (Anonymous, 2017). Over time, companies like this can be
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used for selfish motives, which they have been, and potentially loot the country of its earnings.
Thus, from a sustainable development point of view, authoritarian control over the market as
seen in Rwanda, in the long term, can and very well has a high chance of being more corrupt and
destructive to the nation’s economy.
While the debate on the extent to which foreign aid is beneficial or detrimental to a
country’s development is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to look at it within the
context of democratic freedom. While other, minor political parties develop in the country, they
are blocked from using any foreign assistance, yet Kagame and the RPF are allowed to use
massive amounts of foreign investments to fund their political campaigns, which many of them
do through their investment firms such as Crystal Ventures and Horizon. The hypocrisy is
obvious, but what may not be is that when it comes to sustainable development, the international
community of donors is actually helping to fund and sustain Kagame’s iron fisted rule on the
country- not create a more democratic system to which they, on paper, demand. In a United
Nations resolution document titled 51/240 Agenda for Development “democracy, respect for all
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development, transparent and
accountable governance and administration in all sectors of society, and effective participation by
civil society are also an essential part of the necessary foundations for the realization of social
and people-centred sustainable development” (Anonymous, 1997).  While this paper has looked
closely at all of these violations that perpetuate consistently in the country, so too have I
acknowledged and noted that the international funding has also increased over the years. Why?
International aid goes straight to the priority of the government of Rwanda, which is controlled
ruthlessly by the RPF regime, a regime that enforces autocratic measures to maintain its
authority, even if that means breaking civil and human rights and, on several occasions,
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international law on a regular basis. Furthermore, as I have also proved the economic
development of the country is not as high, great or darling status as many would like to think.
Even still, as aid pours into the country, as Umuhoza and other international financial institutions
have documented, the country’s debt and GDP have slipped or not grown as much as hoped. It
seems clear, after examining the aid dependence, that perhaps Rwanda’s economic success, like
its democratic “experiment” is also a ruse, propped up by funding that pours into the country.
Additionally, what little funding is generated seems to be concentrated among the wealthy
through investment groups owned by the government elite. While the county has made great
strides in many ways, much of this seems like a ruse to appear, in some way, democratic and,
thus, economically successful. However, if the country remains under autocratic rule, like many
other autocracies, I argue its sustainability will eventually collapse. It is important to remember
“the overall goal of sustainable development (SD) is the long-term stability of the economy and
environment; this is only achievable through the integration and acknowledgement of economic,
environmental, and social concerns throughout the decision making process” (Emas, 2015).
Unless Rwanda moves towards a more inclusive and open government, the tensions that still lay
dormant in the country are bound to rise again.
Concluding Remarks:
At the beginning of this research, my intent was to analyze sustainable development from
the viewpoint that democracy and democratic freedoms were not an imperative part to a
country’s overall development strategy. Using Rwanda as a case study, due to its rapid
development after the genocide, I figured that it would be a perfect example of a country who
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has swayed away from democracy and has continued to show an ability to develop sustainably.
However, as I continued to research and dug into the country’s political and economic history,
more and more information altered and eventually changed my conclusion. In the process, I have
found two concluding arguments in regard to the necessity of democracy and the political
freedoms that come with it that lend themselves to their vitalness in sustainable development.
While in the short term, economic development and success has surely been seen, in the long
term the research suggests that the political, social and economic infrastructure of the country is
weak and volatile and will be difficult to maintain and sustain as the country continues to grow
in technology and awareness of the ruling party's political and economic actions. .
1. The Short Term:
Many scholars that I have addressed in this work, like Hilary Matfess, go over the ideas
of benevolent autocracies and how governments like the RPF in Rwanda have created a domestic
legitimacy that comes from their desire to restore peace and stability to the country. Much of this
is done through a method noted by Matfess as the ‘Carrot’ and ‘Stick.’ When Kagame rose to
power after the 1994 social rupture and took control of the presidency in 2000, his message was
around unity and growth, which since then has molded and developed into the RPF government
providing high levels of government services to the people as well as having a strong influence
in the economy.  Due to these services and government intervention, the ‘carrots,’ states like this
earn the “developmental aspect of their moniker” (Matfess, 2015), and develop domestic support
towards their cause. Of course, when a nation is developing, public support is crucial and having
a government that works towards creating a thriving society around services provided by the
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government is, in many ways, seen as a good thing. However, on the other end of the ‘carrot’ is
the ‘stick’ and this is where development can be stunted and has in many ways been stifled in the
case of Rwanda. While perhaps on paper the ‘rapid economic success’ of the country has been
applauded by western nations, the fact of the matter is the abuse and repressionary tactics that
have been used in order to garner this have made us question throughout this work the legitimacy
and sustainability of these measures, both politically and economically. Thus, this brings us to
our point about the long term sustainable development of nations who approach development in
the way that Rwanda has: high aid dependency, political and social rights abuses, and violent
repression of those who offend RPF ideology.
2. The Long Term:
The ‘stick’ aspect of developmental authoritarianism is riddled with, as I have discussed
throughout this work, repressive measures in order to maintain political dominance and control
over the country. In the case of Rwanda, jailings, exiles, assassinations and indoctrination have
all been tactics used to maintain RPF authority and a cult of personality around Kagame, both
domestically and internationally, as the sort of ‘savior’ of Rwanda. While, of course, Kagame’s
leadership did  ultimately bring the genocide to an end, it also ushered in an era of rising
authoritarianism that has been widely ignored and indirectly supported by the international
community. While the evidence does show that GDP growth has occurred in Rwanda since the
genocide, it must be acknowledged that the amount of aid going into the country has also
increased dramatically over the last three decades and its debt has increased to as much as 66%,
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which begs the question of who is growing: the country’s economic structures or the aid
donations?
Rwanda, on paper, is a limited multiparty state, but in reality is truly under the control of
the RPF and Kagame. With the economic development of this country not as great as hoped for,
aid dependency becoming larger and larger parts of the way forward, and criticisms towards
Kagame’s leadership being outwardly repressed, what does the sustainability of this country’s
development look like? Furthermore, if Kagame is the only piece keeping this country together,
what happens when his tyrannical rule comes to an end? Much of the political infrastructure is
still dominated by the Tutsi elite, begging the question on whether cultural tensions could fuel
over in the absence of the iron fisted leader?
As technology has developed and made its way into Rwanda, the ability of people to have
their voices heard becomes harder and harder to repress. Repression still obviously occurs, but
the consistent and violent actions taken against these people has pushed exiles and survivors to
tell their stories, which are now slowly eroding away the legitimacy of Kagame’s monolith of a
vision. A benevolent autocracy can only work if the people they control believe the measures are
benevolent. However, with the Rwandan economic miracle being proven wrong, a regime
dependent on aid and repressive measures to maintain control of the population and
infrastructure, and technology revealing the violent and difficult truths to the masses, the long
term sustainability in Rwanda’s development is truly questionable. Hilary Matfess, at the end of
her work on Developmental Authoritarianism and Strongmen in Africa warrants that this type of
leadership is durable, but eludes that these measures should be adhered to as transitions and not
permanent, stating “promoting democracy and preventing the spread of authoritarianism
therefore requires, at the least, a new approach to the typologies of authoritarian regimes: one
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that takes accounts of both the regimes ascent to power and its programmatic characteristics once
in power” (Matfess, 2015).
3. Sustainable Development: the necessity of democratic freedoms for economic and
political success.
There has been a scholarly discussion over the benefits of having a more authoritarian
style of leadership when it comes to development. Historically, leaders like President Lee Kuan
Yew of Singapore argued the restriction of civil liberties is ultimately good for the development
of a nation and its growth. Even today, some scholars argue countries like China have had
massive development due to the limitations of rights within their country. While the growth of
these countries is impressive, the type of leadership and tools and geopolitical resources at their
disposal are really not comparable when it comes to a small, landlocked country like Rwanda in
the heart of Africa. Furthermore, when analyzing authoritarian development success the Lee
Thesis is “based on very selective information, rather than on any general statistical testing over
the wide-ranging data available” (Sen, 1998). However, it can’t be denied that there seems to be
a conclusion being drawn, arguing that democracy and the freedoms it entails isn’t needed for a
better life and, arguably, countries are buying into this claim. Even western leaders, like former
President Donald Trump, played with these notions in his speeches and admirations for autocrats
like Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-Un. The “strong man” approach has been reinforced in many
ways, and nations supporting autocrats, like Kagame, only serve to push this narrative further.
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As our research comes to an end, I find the words of former Rwandan presidential
candidate Umuhoza imperative: “current governance in Rwanda – that limits political space,
lacks separation of power, impedes freedom of expression and represses critics of the
government – cannot lead to sustainable development” (Umuhoza, 2021). And this research is
important to consider from a Senian perspective, both economically and politically speaking.
Many measurements of growth come from a place of economic foundations- measuring growth
through numbers. But, from what our research has shown, those numbers do not account for the
massive amount of aid brought into the country and how the growth is manipulated by the RPF
governance; it does not measure how political freedoms are pushed aside, nor does it measure the
validity of political governance in the country. I would ask the same question Sen proposes in his
work Development as Freedom: “is this a sensible way of approaching the problems of
economics needs and political freedoms- in terms of basic dichotomy that appears to undermine
the relevance of political freedoms because the economic needs are so urgent?” (Sen, 1998).
Rather, these needs are interconnected and our research has suggested that the eroding of
political and civil freedoms in Rwanda have given way to a situation in which a tyrannical ruler,
who may have started off with benevolent ideology, has delved into a corrupt political world
where the economic gain is not what it actually seems. In even more recent publications, like Do
Not Disturb, new information on the corruption of Kagame’s political forces and tampering of
economic indicators bring to light more indications that his autocratic rule is far from what the
international community contends it to be.
In sustainable development, as long and arduous as a path as it is, incorporation of the
people and their voices is essential. It is the responsibility of the people to pressure their
representatives (voting, protesting and publicly criticizing) in order to maintain a government
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system that feels pressured to represent their people. In the case of Rwanda, those voices are
ousted and have led to a very unstable system with a foundation of fear and indoctrination. This
is not sustainable and it seems as though Rwandans, as their voices are able to be heard
elsewhere (social media platforms) are starting to push for that change in their society. While this
research contended, at first, that democracy may not be imperative to development, the
interviews, statistical data accrued and investigation of how the Rwandan socio-political
structures stand speaks for itself. I argue that the corrupt ways of developmental authoritarianism
may bring about short term development, but in the end, should and must turn to a system that
allows the people more involvement and interaction without fear of their government.
Transitions of power are key and necessary for representation. It is time the era of Kagame
comes to an end and a new era of political inclusivity, driven by the political freedoms necessary
to achieve sustainable development, arises.
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Appendix:
ANNEXE 2 – INSTITUTIONS AU RWANDA
(Situation  décembre 2020)
1. PRÉSIDENCE ET GOUVERNEMENT1
Prénom et nom Fonction adhésion politique,
ethnie, région d’origine
Général Major Paul KAGAME Président de la République FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Judith UWIZEYE
Alphonsine MIREMBE










Inès MPAMBARA Ministre à la Primature chargée
des Affaires du Conseil des
Ministres
FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugiée
Doreen KAGARAMA Secrétaire permanent FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugiée
Jeannette BAYISENGE
Assumpta INGABIRE
Ministre du Genre et de la




Vincent BIRUTA Ministre des Affaires Etrangères
et de la Coopération
Internationale
PSD, Tutsi, Kigali-Ville
Clémentine MUKEKA Secrétaire permanent FPR, Hutu, Gitarama
Anastase SHYAKA Ministre de l’Administration
Locale
FPR, Hutu, Byumba
Samuel DUSENGIYUMVA Secrétaire permanent FPR, Tutsi, Gitarama
Johnston BUSINGYE Ministre de la Justice FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Théophile MBONERA Secrétaire permanent FPR, Hutu, Ruhengeri
Marie Solange KAYISIRE
Olivier KAYUMBA













Claver GATETE Ministre des Infrastructures FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Patricia UWASE Secrétaire permanent FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugiée
1 NP signifie sans affiliation politique officielle. Nous avons maintenu la référence aux anciennes préfectures en
raison de l’absence de signification historique des actuelles provinces.
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Géraldine MUKESHIMANA Ministre de l’Agriculture et de
l’Elevage
FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugiée
Claude MUSABYIMANA Secrétaire permanent PSD, Hutu, Ruhengeri
Jeanne d’Arc
MUJAWAMARIYA
Ministre de l’Environnement FPR, Hutu, Ruhengeri
Patrick KARERA Secrétaire permanent FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Fanfan RWANYINDO
KAYIRANGWA
Ministre de la Fonction
Publique et du Travail
NP, Tutsi, ex-réfugiée
Gaspard MUSONERA Secrétaire permanent FPR, Tutsi, Kigali Rural
Uzziel NDAGIJIMANA Ministre des Finances et de la
Planification Economique
FPR, Hutu, Gitarama
Soraya HAKUZIYAREMYE Ministre du Commerce, de
l’Industrie
NP, Hutu, Gitarama
Michel SEBERA Secrétaire permanent FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Valentine UWAMARIYA Ministre de l’Education FPR, Hutu, Cyangugu
Samuel MULINDWA Secrétaire permanent FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Aurore Mimosa
MUNYANGAJU
Ministre des Sports FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugiée
Didier SHEMA MABOKO Secrétaire permanent FPR, Hutu, Kigali-Ville
Daniel NGAMIJE Ministre de la Santé FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Zacharie IYAMUREMYE Secrétaire permanent 
Paula INGABIRE
Yves IRADUKUNDA


















Solina NYIRAHABIMANA Secrétaire d’Etat au ministère de
la Justice chargé de la
Constitution et des autres lois
FPR, Hutu, Gitarama
Gaspard TWAGIRAYEZU Secrétaire d’État au ministère de
l’Éducation chargé des écoles
primaires et secondaires
Claudette IRERE Secrétaire d’État au ministère de






Edouard BAMPORIKI Secrétaire d’Etat chargé de la




Secrétaire d’Etat au Ministère
de la Santé chargé de la santé
publique et des soins de santé
primaires.
FPR, Tutsi, ex-refugié
Claudine UWERA Secrétaire d’Etat au ministère
des Finances et de la
Planification économique
chargée de la planification
économique.
FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugiée
Richard TUSHABE Secrétaire d’Etat au ministère
des Finances et de la
Planification économique
chargé des Finances Publiques
FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Manassé NSHUTI Secrétaire d’Etat au ministère
des Affaires Etrangères, chargé





Secrétaire d’Etat au ministère de
l’Agriculture et de l’Elevage
PSD, Hutu, Gikongoro
Clare AKAMANZI CEO of RDB FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugiée
Francis GATARE CEO of Rwanda Mines,
Petroleum and Gas Board
FPR, Tutsi, ex-refugié
2.  GOUVERNEURS
Province prénom et nom adhésion politique, ethnie,
région d’origine
Province de l’Est Fred MUFURUKYE FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Province du Nord Jean Marie Vianney
GATABAZI
FPR, Hutu, Byumba
Province de l’Ouest Alphonse MUNYENTWARI FPR, Tutsi, Butare
Province du Sud Alice KAYITESI FPR, Tutsi, Gitarama
Mairie de Kigali Pudence RUBINGISA FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
  
3.  APPAREIL JUDICIAIRE








Cour d’Appel Aimé KALIMUNDA
MUYOBOKE
Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Haute Cour Xavier NDAHAYO Hutu, Byumba
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Procureur Général de la
République
Aimable HAVUGIYAREMYE Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Rwanda Investigation
Bureau (RIB)
Colonel Jeannot RUHUNGA FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
4.  FORCES RWANDAISES DE DÉFENSE (FRD)
Institution prénom et nom adhésion politique, ethnie,
région d’origine
Commandant en chef Général-Major Paul KAGAME FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Chef d’État-major général Général Jean Bosco KAZURA FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Chef d’État-major de
l’armée de terre










General Fred IBINGIRA FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
5.  CORPS DIPLOMATIQUE
lieu d’accréditation prénom et nom adhésion politique, ethnie,
région d’origine
Abuja Stanislas KAMANZI PSD, Hutu, Byumba
Abu Dhabi Emmanuel HATEGEKA FPR, Tutsi, Butare
Addis-Abeba Hope TUMUKUNDE FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Accra Aissa KIRABO KACYIRA FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugiée
Ankara Fidelis MIRONKO FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Berlin César IGOR FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Brazzaville Théoneste MUTSINDASHYAKA FPR, Tutsi, Kigali-Ville
Bruxelles Dieudonné SEBASHONGORE FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Bujumbura Vacant
Dakar Jean-Pierre KARABARANGA FPR, Tutsi, Butare
Dar es Salam Général-Major Charles KARAMBA FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Genève Marie Chantal RWAKAZINA FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugiée
Harare James MUSONI FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Kampala Colonel Joseph RUTABANA FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Khartoum Colonel MUNYANEZA MUZUNGU FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Kinshasa Vincent KAREGA FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
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La Haye Olivier NDUHUNGIREHE PSD, Hutu, Butare
Le Caire Alfred KALISA FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Londres Yamina KARITANYI FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugiée
Luanda Wellars GASAMAGERA FPR, Tutsi, Gitarama
Lusaka Amandin RUGIRA FPR, Hutu, Cyangugu
Maputo Claude NIKOBISANZWE FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Moscou Lieutenant Général MUSHYO
KAMANZI
FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Nairobi Richard MASOZERA FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
New Delhi Jacqueline MUKANGIRA FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugiée
New York Valentine RUGWABIZA FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugiée
Ottawa Prosper HIGIRO PL, Tutsi, Kibungo
Paris François Xavier NGARAMBE FPR, Tutsi, Gitarama
Pékin James KIMONYO PSD, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
Pretoria Eugene SEGORE KAYIHURA FPR, Tutsi, ex-réfugié
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